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UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

In re Laundry CEO LLC

Serial No. 98382558

Andrea Hence Evans of The Law Firm of Andrea Hence Evans, LLC,
for Laundry CEO LLC.

Jenna Dibble, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 122,
Kristin Dahling, Managing Attorney.

Before Goodman, Thurmon and Lavache,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Goodman, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Laundry CEO LLC ("Applicant") seeks registration on the Principal Register of the mark LAUNDRY CEO (in standard characters) for the following goods and services:

> Downloadable non-fiction books on a variety of topics; Electronic publications, namely, books, magazines, manuals, e-books, newsletters, e-journals, and training videos featuring business, all recorded on computer media in International Class 9;
>
> Series of printed non-fiction books in the field of business in International Class 16; and

> Education services, namely, providing classes, seminars, and workshops in the field of business; Educational and entertainment services, namely, providing motivational speaking services in the field of business; Providing online non-downloadable electronic publications in the nature of books, magazines, manuals, e-books, blogs, newsletters, e-journals, and training videos in the field of business in International Class 41.[1]

The Trademark Examining Attorney has refused registration of Applicant's proposed mark under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1), on the ground that the applied-for mark is merely descriptive.

When the refusal was made final, Applicant appealed and requested reconsideration. After the Examining Attorney denied the request for reconsideration, the appeal was resumed. We affirm the refusal to register.

I. Mere Descriptiveness

In the absence of acquired distinctiveness, which Applicant does not claim here, Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act prohibits the registration of a mark which, when used on or in connection with an applicant's goods or services, is merely descriptive of them. "A term is merely descriptive if it immediately conveys knowledge of a quality, feature, function, or characteristic of the goods or services with which it is used." *In re Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.*, 675 F.3d 1297, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting *In re Bayer AG*, 488 F.3d 960, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2007)); *see also In re Gyulay*,

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[1] Application Serial No. 98382558 was filed on January 30, 2024, based upon Applicant's assertion of a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce under Section 1(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b).
Page references to the application record are to the online database of the USPTO's Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) system. References to the briefs on appeal refer to the Board's TTABVUE docket system. Applicant's brief is at 6 TTABVUE; the Examining Attorney's brief is at 8 TTABVUE.

820 F.2d 1216, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1987). A mark need not immediately convey an idea of each and every specific feature of the goods or services in order to be considered merely descriptive; rather, it is sufficient that the mark describes a significant attribute, function or property of the goods or services. *In re Chamber of Commerce*, 675 F.3d at 1300; *In re H.U.D.D.L.E.*, No. 73211831, 1982 TTAB LEXIS 41 at *3.

A mark's descriptiveness must be "considered in relation to the particular goods [or services] for which registration is sought, the context in which it is being used, and the possible significance that the term would have to the average purchaser of the goods [or services] because of the manner of its use or intended use." *Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC*, 668 F.3d 1356, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing *In re Bayer*, 488 F.3d at 964). The determination of mere descriptiveness must not be made in the abstract or on the basis of guesswork. *In re Abcor Dev. Corp.*, 588 F.2d 811, 814 (CCPA 1978). The question is whether someone who knows what the goods or services are will understand the term to convey information about them. *DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Medical Devices Ltd.*, 695 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

Where a mark consists of multiple terms, the mere combination of descriptive terms does not necessarily create a non-descriptive word or phrase. *In re Phoseon Tech., Inc.*, No. 77963815, 2012 TTAB LEXIS 306, at * 3; *In re Associated Theatre Clubs Co.*, No. 73557499 1988 TTAB LEXIS 48, at *6. Whether the composite mark also has a merely descriptive significance turns on the question of whether the combination of terms evokes a new and unique commercial impression. In other words, we must consider the issue of descriptiveness by looking at the mark in its

entirety. *See DuoProSS Meditech Corp.,* 695 F.3d at 1252 ("When determining whether a mark is merely descriptive, the Board must consider the commercial impression of a mark as a whole.").

Nonetheless, in the course of evaluating the mark as a whole, we may consider the merely descriptive significance of each element separately. *DuoProSS Meditech Corp.,* 695 F.3d at 1253 (noting that "[t]he Board to be sure, can ascertain the meaning and weight of each of the components that makes up the mark."). If each component retains its merely descriptive significance in relation to the goods or services, the combination results in a composite that is itself merely descriptive. *See, e.g., In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP*, 373 F.3d 1171, 1174-75 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

Evidence of the purchasing public's understanding of a term may be obtained from any competent source, such as purchaser testimony, consumer surveys, listings in dictionaries, trade journals, newspapers[,] and other publications." *Real Foods Pty Ltd. v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc.*, 906 F.3d 965, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting *Royal Crown Co. v. Coca-Cola Co.*, 892 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). "These sources may include [w]ebsites, publications and use in labels, packages, or in advertising materials directed to the goods [or services]." *In re N.C. Lottery*, 866 F.3d 1363, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (internal quotation omitted)). Evidence may also be obtained from Applicant's own website and specimen of use and any explanatory text included therein. *Id.*

The entire record has been considered and relevant evidence is discussed throughout this opinion, although we do not list its contents. *See Quiktrip W., Inc. v.*

Weigel Stores, Inc., 984 F.3d 1031, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ("We have held 'on multiple occasions that failure to explicitly discuss every issue or every piece of evidence does not alone establish that the tribunal did not consider it.'") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

II. Arguments and Analysis

The Examining Attorney argues that "the individual components and the composite" are merely descriptive and "that the composite term 'LAUNDRY CEO' immediately conveys to applicant's consumers that applicant's publications and educational and entertainment services are intended for CEOs in the laundry business." 8 TTABVUE 4.

Applicant argues that "the combination of the terms in Applicant's mark do not inform the consumer of exactly what is being provided "immediately or with any degree of particularity." Applicant submits that "'Laundry' has no immediate meaning in connection with entertainment and educational services and books relating to business." 6 TTABVUE 7, 8. And "the use of CEO, even where CEO's are the subject matter, … is not specific enough to immediately bring to mind Applicant's goods and services." 6 TTABVUE 9.

Where there is record evidence of an applicant's use of the proposed mark, the Board "must consider [the] mark in its commercial context to determine the public's perception." *In re N.C. Lottery*, 866 F.3d at 1367-68. The Examining Attorney provided webpages regarding Applicant's LAUNDRY CEO forum, podcasts, and a blogpost to support the refusal. Those webpages indicate that the Laundry CEO

forum is directed to entrepreneurship and being a laundry owner and operator.[2] April 24, 2025 Denial of Reconsideration at TSDR at 2-5; August 28, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 5. The webpages explain that the Laundry CEO forum is a gathering of owners, operators, investors, managers and entrepreneurs in the laundry business ("powerful leaders in laundry" and "laundry business owners" "opportunities for laundromat owners to scale their business" "supporting laundry business owners" "the event where market leaders are made" "for laundry business owners/operators" "created to bring together the brightest minds in the industry. Leaders who are shaping the future of laundry."). April 24, 2025 Denial of Reconsideration at TSDR 2-3; August 28, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 5. These individuals may be CEOs (decision makers) in their laundry business. The Examining Attorney provided a couple of webpages with Applicant's blogposts, for which Applicant's principal is the author; one of the webpages states "each week, I write an editorial (washweekly.com) that goes out to laundry entrepreneurs worldwide, sharing unconventional thinking and insights on building a laundry business." April 24, 2025 Denial of Reconsideration at TSDR 4. A webpage relating to Applicant's podcasts states "[j]oin me as I have conversations with laundry owners and operators who share their stories, insights, and lessons, for you to excel in the laundry industry." April 24, 2025 Denial of Reconsideration at 5; August 28, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 6; November 19, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 9 (blogpost article discussing laundry business owners).

[2] Applicant points out the word CEOs is never used on the YoutTube page, although it acknowledges that there may be an interview with a CEO in a podcast. 6 TTABVUE 10.

The Examining Attorney provided dictionary definitions for the terms "laundry" and "ceo" and provided third-party registrations on the Principal Register with disclaimers of CEO as well as third-party registrations of marks on the Supplemental Register that contain the term CEO. August 28, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 2-4; November 19, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 5-8; April 24, 2025 Denial of Reconsideration at TSDR 10-26.[3] The Examining Attorney also provided third-party website evidence relating to the laundry industry and laundry services. November 19, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 2-4; April 24, 2025 Denial of Reconsideration Denied TSDR at 6-9.

The first term LAUNDRY in Applicant's mark is defined as "[a] commercial establishment for laundering clothes or linens." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (ahdictionary.com), August 28, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 2. The third-party website evidence submitted by the Examining Attorney shows that "laundry" is used to describe the laundry industry and laundry services which involve the business of providing services for washing and drying clothes. November 19, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 2-4; April 24, 2025 Denial of Reconsideration Denied at TSDR at 6-9.

As indicated, the Examining Attorney provided information about Applicant's LAUNDRY CEO forum (laundryceo.com), YouTube podcasts, and blogposts. For example, Laundryceo.com states: "The Laundry CEO Forum is … designed for laundry business owners/operators, and industry professionals who desire to grow

[3] As discussed infra, Applicant provided third-party registrations to counter this evidence. October 1, 2024 response to Office Action at TSDR 14-23; February 6, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at TSDR 8-33.

their profits and gain more customers." August 28, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 3. The webpages show that Applicant provides workshops, talks and networking for the owners, operators, and managers in the garment care or laundry industry. *See* April 24, 2025 Denial of Reconsideration at TSDR 2, 3 ("laundry business owners" "for laundry business owners/operators" "Leaders who are shaping the future of laundry," "opportunities for laundromat owners to scale their business"); August 28, 2024 at TSDR 5-6; November 19, 2024 at TSDR 9. The YouTube webpage includes a podcast titled "From Pick & Delivery to Owning a Laundromat." August 28, 2024 at TSDR 6.

Applicant argues that LAUNDRY "has no immediate meaning in connection with entertainment and educational services, and books relating to business" as identified in the involved application. 6 TTABVUE 7.

However, since Applicant's Class 9, 16, and 41 goods and services are identified as being in the business field without limitation, the identification must be presumed to include the laundry business. *In re AC Webconnecting Holding B.V.*, No. 85635277, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 428, at *32 (TTAB 2020) (services that are "identified without limitation ... must be presumed to include" all specific subsets of those services within the broad identification). We find LAUNDRY is merely descriptive of the subject matter of Applicant's Class 9, 16 and 41 downloadable and nondownloadable electronic publications, printed books, videos, and educational and entertainment services because the evidence shows that Applicant is using its mark within the laundry market.

The second term in Applicant's mark is CEO which is defined as "chief executive officer," AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY. *Id*. at TSDR 3, and "the executive with the chief decision-making authority in an organization or business." MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (merriam-webster.com) *Id*. at 4.

In the November 19, 2024 Office Action (at TSDR 5-8), the Examining Attorney provided three third-party Supplemental Register registrations incorporating the term CEO, two of which cover similar Class 41 services as Applicant's. In the April 24, 2025 Denial of Reconsideration (at TSDR 10-26), the Examining Attorney provided 17 third-party registrations that identify services similar to Applicant's Class 41 services. Three of the registrations issued on the Supplemental Register and the remaining registrations issued on the Principal Register with disclaimers of CEO.[4] These third-party registrations are for the purpose of showing the Office's treatment, as merely descriptive, of the term CEO for the same or similar Class 41 services as those in the application.[5] *Cf. In re Country Music Ass'n*, Nos. 78906900, 2011 TTAB LEXIS 343, at *28 (third-party registrations submitted by the Examining

[4] *In re DNI Holdings Ltd*., No. 76331011, 2005 TTAB LEXIS 515, at *25 ("it has long been held that the disclaimer of a term constitutes an admission of the merely descriptive nature of that term, as applied to the goods or services in connection with which it is registered, and an acknowledgment of the lack of an exclusive right therein at the time of the disclaimer."); *In re Consol. Foods Corp*., 1978 TTAB LEXIS 108, at *2 n.2 (no number in original) ("Registration of the same mark on the Supplemental Register is not prima facie evidence of distinctiveness; in fact, such a registration is an admission of descriptiveness") (citing *Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp. v. Quaker Oil Corp*., 453 F.2d 1296, 1299 (CCPA 1972)).

[5] Two of the third-party registrations cover relevant Class 9 goods as well as Class 41 services; one third-party registration covers relevant Class 16 goods and Class 41 services. Another registration covers Classes 9 and 16 goods and Class 41 services but only the Class 41 services are relevant. These registrations are too few to determine the Office's treatment of the term CEO in Classes 9 and 16.

Attorney "show the Office's consistent treatment of the word 'association' as a generic term when used in connection with association services such as those identified in applicant's application").

To counter this evidence, Applicant provided five third-party registrations in its October 1, 2024 response to Office Action (at TSDR 14-23) and 11 third-party registrations in its February 6, 2025 Request for Reconsideration (at TSDR 8-33). Applicant argues that the third-party registrations support its position that CEO is not merely descriptive in connection with its services. 6 TTABVUE 8, 9, 16. However, of the five registrations submitted on October 1, 2024, one has been cancelled according to the Examining Attorney.[6] April 24, 2025 Denial of Reconsideration at TSDR 1. Three of the registrations are for services different from Applicant's services, leaving only one registration which does not include a disclaimer of CEO.

As to the eleven third-party registrations submitted by Applicant on February 6, 2025, one is for services different than the Class 41 services identified, seven of the registrations issued on the Supplemental Register, and one registration cancelled according to the Examining Attorney. 8 TTABVUE 11. As the Examining Attorney points out, the submission of Supplemental Register registrations undercuts Applicant's argument that CEO is not descriptive. 8 TTABVUE 10-11. Of the two remaining registrations in the February 6, 2025 submission, one registration does not include a disclaimer presumably because the term CEO in the mark incorporates

[6] Expired registrations are "not evidence of anything except that it issued." *Time Warner Entm't Co. L.P. v. Jones*, No. 91112409, 2002 TTAB LEXIS 462, at *4.

a design element, while the other is a Principal Register registration that does not have a disclaimer of the term CEO.

Based on the evidence, the term CEO often has been treated by the Office as merely descriptive in connection with services similar to Applicant's Class 41 educational and entertainment services. Although Applicant has provided a few registrations which did not require a disclaimer, these registrations highlight why prior decisions in other applications are not binding on the Board and underscore the need to evaluate each case on its own record. *In re Nett Designs Inc.*, 236 F.3d 1339, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001). And here, the evidence shows that Applicant uses the applied-for mark to provide goods and services to decision makers and business leaders (which would include CEOs) in the laundry market.

Although Applicant argues that its evidence reflects that the term CEO does not immediately bring to mind a specific meaning in connection with its identified goods and services, 6 TTABVUE 8-10, we find that the Examining Attorney's third-party registration evidence and the third-party Supplemental Register registrations submitted by Applicant support a finding of mere descriptiveness of the term CEO in connection with Applicant's identified Class 41 services. Consistent with this, Applicant's website, which discusses the Laundry CEO forum, indicates that its educational and entertainment services are directed to decision makers–leaders who are owners, operators and managers in the laundry industry that may be CEOs.

Based on the dictionary definitions, third-party registrations, and various website evidence relating to Applicant, we find the term CEO is merely descriptive in relation

to Applicant's identified goods and services as it describes the intended user of the goods or services, i.e., leaders or aspiring leaders in the laundry industry (owners, officers, managers and entrepreneurs), that would include CEOs.

We now consider the mere descriptiveness of the combined term LAUNDRY CEO. Under the dictionary definitions of the words "laundry" and "CEO," the combined term LAUNDRY CEO describes an executive with the chief decision-making authority in an organization or business in the nature of a commercial establishment for laundering clothes or linens. The website pages from Applicant and the YouTube podcast page shows that Applicant's services are directed to owners, operators, managers, and entrepreneurs in the laundry business. We find that the terms LAUNDRY CEO when combined do not lose their descriptive significance. LAUNDRY CEO describes the subject matter and intended user of Applicant's goods and services, conveying that Applicant's business education services, publications and videos are intended for executives and feature subject matter related to the laundry industry. *In re Planalytics, Inc.*, No. 76322156, 2004 TTAB LEXIS 198, at *3. ("A mark can be descriptive if it describes the intended users of the goods or services.").

Applicant argues the mark is suggestive. 6 TTABVUE 15. Although Applicant acknowledges that its books, educational, and entertainment services may discuss the laundry industry, it argues that because "the focus of Applicant's goods and services state that they cover a number of topics, including the broadly stated business industry, … it would require several steps of reasoning for the consumer to

determine that LAUNDRY CEO immediately brings to mind books, motivational speaking, and educational services in the field of business." 6 TTABVUE 8.

It appears that Applicant is arguing that multi-step reasoning is required because of the broad nature of the identification which is for print and electronic publications and educational and entertainment services in the business industry. A term may be merely descriptive if the identified goods and services fall within a subset of services indicated by the term. The fact that a term or phrase may not be merely descriptive of some of the goods or services listed in the identification does not mean that it is not merely descriptive of the others. *See In re Application of Quik-Print Copy Shops, Inc.*, 616 F.2d 523, 525 (CCPA 1980); *In re Richardson Ink Co.*, 511 F.2d 559, 561 (CCPA 1975).

Here, the print and electronic publication goods and the educational and entertainment services are broadly described as featuring business or being in the field of business which encompasses the laundry business/industry and being directed to CEO's in the laundry industry. In addition, Applicant's website (webpages), YouTube page and blog posts on washweekly.com show that its goods and services are directed to owners, entrepreneurs, managers, and officers—leaders in the laundry industry who are often the CEOs of those businesses.

Applicant submits that "the [LAUNDRY CEO] combines two terms that have no connotation when used together, much less any immediate and/or particular meaning with Applicant's products and services," and "does not convey any information about its entertainment and information services with the particularity required" or

describe the identified "type of content or learning material" and while "listeners [may have] some theories as to who is providing content, and maybe the nature of that content, it does not immediately inform consumers as to what will be discussed" without the listeners "tuning in."[7] 6 TTABVUE 7, 8, 12.

As has often been stated, "a term is merely descriptive if it forthwith conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the goods [or services]." *In re Abcor Dev. Corp.*, 588 F.2d at 812. "[T]he immediate idea must be conveyed forthwith with a degree of particularity." *Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cont'l Gen. Tire, Inc.*, No. 75745727, 2003 TTAB LEXIS 277, at *8.

However, "the requisite degree of particularity" standard does not require that the term convey precise information." *Id.* at *37. While it is true that, in order for a mark to be held merely descriptive, it must describe an attribute of the associated goods and services with some particularity, it is not necessary that the mark describe each and every aspect of the goods or services in order for the mark to be merely descriptive. *See In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP*, 373 F.3d at 1173 ("A mark may be merely descriptive even if it does not describe the 'full scope and extent' of the applicant's goods or services," citing *In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp.*, 240 F.3d 1341, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). It is settled that, to be descriptive, the mark need describe only a single significant attribute of the goods or services. *See In re Gyulay*, 820 F.2d at 1217; *see, e.g., In re Entenmann's, Inc.*, No. 74712062, 1990 TTAB LEXIS

[7] Applicant submits LAUNDRY CEO is not descriptive in connection with podcasts. 6 TTABVUE 12.

26, at * 3-4 (OATNUT held merely descriptive of bread containing oats and hazelnuts because it "readily informs purchasers, with the required degree of particularity, of two not inconsequential ingredients" of the product, even though the kind of nut is not specified by such term).

Here, in the context of the Applicant's print and electronic publications and educational and entertainment services, a significant subject area (laundry business) and potential users of the goods and services are officers/owners (CEOs) in the laundry business. Therefore, LAUNDRY CEO does describe the goods and services with sufficient particularity to enable a consumer to immediately form an impression as to the subject matter and intended user of the goods and services.

Applicant argues that "with 'laundry' referring to dirty clothes, [LAUNDRY CEO] is only suggestive to be considered a chief executive officer of these articles." 6 TTABVUE 11. Applicant also contends the mark is suggestive because LAUNDRY CEO is nebulous and vague and does not provide an immediate, descriptive meaning. 6 TTABVUE 9, 14, 16. In support, Applicant argues that "LAUNDRY CEO could refer to the Applicant themselves as someone who is the Chief Executive Officer of a laundry business, it could refer to classes for people to become the owner of their own laundry business, or it could be motivational speeches by current Chief Executive Officers in the laundry business. The word has several connotations, which is the hallmark of a suggestive mark." 6 TTABVUE 14. Applicant also references the third-party registrations it submitted for THE LEADER and FREELANCE CFO as

examples of suggestive marks.[8] 6 TTAVUE 11; February 6, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at TSDR 34-36.

All of these potential meanings of LAUNDRY CEO provided by Applicant merely describe a significant characteristic or feature of Applicant's identified goods and services. A term that has multiple meanings, all of which are merely descriptive of the goods or services, remains merely descriptive within the meaning of Section 2(e)(1). *See In re Carlson*, No. 78752616, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 438. But regardless of other potential meanings in other contexts, in the context of Applicant's goods and services, the record sufficiently demonstrates that the designation LAUNDRY CEO immediately conveys to the consumer a significant feature or attribute of Applicant's identified goods and services.

Applicant argues that LAUNDRY CEO is incongruous as the meaning is "not apparent" and is "impossible." 6 TTABVUE 11.

As to incongruity, it must be shown that in combination, the descriptiveness of the individual words has been diminished, and that the combination creates a term so incongruous or unusual as to possess no definitive meaning or significance other than that of an identifying mark for the goods or services. *In re Medical Disposables Co*., No. 74098753, 1992 TTAB LEXIS 60, at *6. *See e.g., In re Calphalon Corp*., No. 86356713, 2017 TTAB LEXIS 98, at *27 ("incongruity exists, for example, where a

[8] However, these marks, as the Examining Attorney points out, contain different terms than those involved herein, limiting their probative value. 8 TTABVUE 10.

term evokes an immediate association with something unrelated to the goods or services").

We find no incongruity. Combining the merely descriptive terms LAUNDRY and CEO into the composite LAUNDRY CEO does not negate their mere descriptiveness, nor does it create a composite that is incongruous. Here, the combination, merely describes the subject matter and potential user of the goods and services.

Applicant argues that "[t]he Examining Attorney is guessing that the intended user of applicant's goods and services are Laundry CEO's, even though there is no such thing as this type of officer. There is no evidence that LAUNDRY CEO is anything more than a made up term." 6 TTABVUE 11.

The evidence shows that a potential consumer could discern a significant feature or characteristic of Applicant's goods and services without guesswork. The fact that the term LAUNDRY CEO is not in the dictionary and is "made up" is not controlling on the question of registrability. *See In re Dahlquist, Inc.*, 1976 TTAB LEXIS 79, at *6 (no number in original). Moreover, the fact that an applicant may be the first user of a merely descriptive designation does not justify registration if the only significance conveyed by the term is merely descriptive as it is here. *See In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC*, No. 86490930 2016 TTAB LEXIS 150, at *10. In this case, as the third-party registrations reflect, the mark does not appear to be made-up but follows a normal naming convention of identifying CEOs of different businesses.

Applicant argues that the vagueness of the wording and co-existence of third-party registrations, establish that doubt should be resolved in its favor. 6 TTABVUE 16,

17. While we do resolve doubts in descriptiveness cases in favor of the applicant, we have no such doubts based on the record in this case.

III. Conclusion

In view of the foregoing, we find Applicant's mark LAUNDRY CEO when applied to the identified Class 9 and 16 goods and Class 41 services to be merely descriptive.

Decision: The Section 2(e)(1) refusal to register Applicant's mark LAUNDRY CEO is affirmed.