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Sent: 2/21/2019 8:23:21 AM

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Subject: U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 87147819 - SHAKY - PANAM-20323 - Request for Reconsideration Denied - Return to TTAB

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**UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)
OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT'S TRADEMARK APPLICATION**

U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 87147819

MARK: SHAKY



CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS:

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GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION:

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APPLICANT: Pan American Properties, Corp.

CORRESPONDENT'S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO:

PANAM-20323

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REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION DENIED

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 2/21/2019

The trademark examining attorney has carefully reviewed applicant's request for reconsideration and is denying the request for the reasons stated below. See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(3); TMEP §§715.03(a)(ii)(B), 715.04(a). The following refusal made final in the Office action dated August 8, 2018 is maintained and continues to be final: Trademark Act Section 2(d) refusal—likelihood of confusion. See TMEP §§715.03(a)(ii)(B), 715.04(a).

In the present case, applicant's request has not resolved the outstanding issue, nor does it raise a new issue or provide any new or compelling evidence with regard to the outstanding issue in the final Office action. In addition, applicant's analysis and arguments are not persuasive nor do they shed new light on the issues. Specifically, applicant restated the arguments it made in its previous responses and continued the assertion that the examining attorney has not met his burden of establishing that there is a likelihood of confusion.

Applicant also provided evidence in the form of a third-party registration for the mark SHAKY covering goods and services in Class 009, 016, and 041 and asserted that the coexistence of that registration and the cited registration indicate that applicant's mark could also coexist with the registrant's mark. These registrations appear to be for goods and/or services predominantly different from or unrelated to those identified in applicant's application.

The weakness or dilution of a particular mark is generally determined in the context of the number and nature of similar marks in use in the marketplace in connection with similar goods and/or services. See *Nat'l Cable Tel. Ass'n, Inc. v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc.*, 937 F.2d 1572, 1579-80, 19 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1991); *In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.*, 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973). Evidence of widespread third-party use of similar marks with similar goods and/or services "is relevant to show that a mark is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of protection" in that particular industry or field. *Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondée en 1772*, 396 F.3d 1369, 1373-74, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see *In re Coors Brewing Co.*, 343 F.3d 1340, 1345, 68 USPQ2d 1059, 1062-63 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

However, evidence comprising only a small number of third-party registrations for similar marks with similar goods and/or services, as in the present case, is generally entitled to little weight in determining the strength of a mark. See *In re i.am.symbolic, llc*, 866 F.3d 1315, 1328-29, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1751-52 (Fed. Cir. 2017); *AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Products, Inc.*, 474 F.2d 1403, 1406, 177 USPQ 268, 269 (C.C.P.A. 1973). These few registrations are "not evidence of what happens in the market place or that customers are familiar with them." *AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Prods., Inc.*, 474 F.2d at 1406, 177 USPQ at 269; *In re I-Coat Co.*, 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1735 (TTAB 2018). Thus, the few similar third-party registrations submitted by applicant are insufficient to establish that the wording SHAKY is weak or diluted.

Further, evidence comprising third-party registrations for similar marks with different or unrelated goods and/or services, as in the present case, has "no bearing on the strength of the term in the context relevant to this case." See *Tao Licensing, LLC v. Bender Consulting Ltd.*, 125 USPQ2d 1043, 1058 (TTAB 2017) (citing *In re i.am.symbolic, llc*, 866 F.3d at 1328, 123 USPQ2d at 1751). Thus, these third-party registrations submitted by applicant are insufficient to establish that the wording SHAKY is weak or diluted.

As noted in the previously issued Office actions, applicant's mark comprises the first and dominant component of the registrant's mark. Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark. See *Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772*, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because "VEUVE . . . remains a 'prominent feature' as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"); *Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am.*, 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because "consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word"); see also *In re Detroit Athletic Co.*, 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding "the identity of the marks' two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first").

Moreover, the examining attorney reiterates that the evidence of record establishes that it is common in the clothing industry for consumers and manufacturers to use shortened formatives of marks to identify their clothing. Although applicant's mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant's mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant's mark. See *In re Mighty Leaf Tea*, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting *United States Shoe Corp.*, 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)). Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion. See *In re Mighty Leaf Tea*, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; *In re Optica Int'l*, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). In this case, applicant's mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark.

Accordingly, the request is denied.

If applicant has already filed a timely notice of appeal with the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, the Board will be notified to resume the appeal. See TMEP §715.04(a).

If no appeal has been filed and time remains in the six-month response period to the final Office action, applicant has the remainder of the response period to (1) comply with and/or overcome any outstanding final requirement(s) and/or refusal(s), and/or (2) file a notice of appeal to the Board. TMEP §715.03(a)(ii)(B); see 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(3). The filing of a request for reconsideration does not stay or extend the time for filing an appeal. 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(3); see TMEP §§715.03, 715.03(a)(ii)(B), (c).

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