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IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

Proceeding	92043152
Party	Defendant SANTANA'S GRILL, INC. SANTANA'S GRILL, INC. 2067 Cecelia Terrace San Diego, CA 92110
Correspondence Address	Nicole Whyte Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara 20320 SW Birch St, 2nd Fl Newport Beach, CA 92660 UNITED STATES msandstrum@bremerandwhyte.com, mstarn@bremerandwhyte.com
Submission	Motion for Default Judgment
Filer's Name	Michael A. Sandstrum
Filer's e-mail	msandstrum@bremerandwhyte.com, mstarn@bremerandwhyte.com
Signature	/Michael A. Sandstrum/
Date	01/18/2007
Attachments	Cover Letter - Motion for Judgment.pdf (2 pages)(88139 bytes) Registrant's Motion for Judgment.pdf (23 pages)(476835 bytes)

KEITH G. BREMER
RAYMOND MEYER, JR.[1]
PETER C. BROWN[8]
JOHN V. O'MEARA[4]
KERE K. TICKNER[1]
CHRISTOPHER NATLAND[1]
MICHAEL A. SANDSTRUM[1]
TYLER D. OFFENHAUSER[1]
PATRICK AU[1]
JEFFREY D. HOLLAND[16]
RENEE M. SHARP[10]
NELSON L. COHEN[2]
JEREMY S. JOHNSON[1]

KAREN M. BAYTOSH[1]
MONIQUE R. LINSON[1]
JOHN H. TOOHEY[3]
PETER H. CROSSIN[1]
STEPHANIE N. RACHEL[1]
VIK NAGPAL[1]
GREGORY J. CARPENTER[1]
CARLO E. CARAVETTA[1]
GEORGE P. HAND, JR.[17]
RUSSELL B. BROWN[7]
ANDREW CRANER[14]
ARASH S. ARABI[1]
LANETTA D.W. RINEHART[1]
ROBERT E. GIBSON[1]
PAUL A. ACKER[9]
FRED C. PAGE[9]

OF COUNSEL
DAVID G. MOLINARI[1]
JARED SIMMONS[16]

DAVID J. MARTIN
KEITH B. GIBSON[16]
ALISON K. HURLEY[1]
RYAN O. HODGE[1]
JOHN J. BELANGER[15]
STEPHENIE M. ALEXANDER[1]
CRISTI K. BARKER[12]
BRENNA V. COX[1]
ROBERT L. BOOKER II[1]
MARIA A. STARN[1]
JASMINE MOTAZEDI[1]
ROXANNE IRANI[1]
ANA FONSECA ESTEPHAN[1]
JOSHUA BORDIN-WOSK[1]
SHAD W. BLACKFORD[13]
JENNY L.B. FOLEY[9]
HANEEFAH S. MOREHEAD[9]
PAUL PITINGARO[1]
ELIZABETH L. DOLAN[1]
KRISTI M. MORLEY[15]
RICK L. PETERSON[1]
NILAM J. PATEL[1]
MOSES A. COHEN[2]
DEVIN R. LUCAS[1]
ANDY MENDOZA[1]
HARRY J. ROSENTHAL[8]
RUSTY A. HAGEN[1]
HEATHER K. ROWELL[1]
MICHELLE L. HOBBS[1]

1 Admitted in California
2 Admitted in California and Nevada
3 Admitted in California and Arizona
4 Admitted in California and Illinois
5 Admitted in California and Minnesota
6 Admitted in California, Nevada and Colorado
7 Admitted in California, Florida and New Jersey
8 Admitted in California, Nevada, Arizona and Colorado
9 Admitted in Nevada
10 Admitted in Nevada and Arizona
11 Admitted in Nevada and Washington D.C.
12 Admitted in Nevada and Oregon
13 Admitted in Nevada and New Mexico
14 Admitted in Nevada and Pennsylvania
15 Admitted in Arizona
16 Admitted in Arizona and Texas
17 Admitted in Nevada and New York
18 Admitted in Nevada, Arizona and Texas
19 Admitted in Nevada, Illinois and Missouri

BREMER WHYTE BROWN & O'MEARA LLP

BREMER WHYTE

ATTORNEYS
20320 S.W. BIRCH STREET
SECOND FLOOR
NEWPORT BEACH, CALIFORNIA 92660
(949) 221-1000
(949) 221-1001 FAX
www.bremerandwhyte.com

21271 BURBANK BLVD.
SUITE 110
WOODLAND HILLS, CA 91367
(818) 712-9800
(818) 712-9900 FAX

SAN DIEGO OFFICE
550 WEST C STREET
SUITE 1450
SAN DIEGO, CA 92101
(619) 236-0048
(619) 236-0047 FAX

RIVERSIDE OFFICE
5225 CANYON CREST DRIVE
SUITE 71-363
RIVERSIDE, CA 92507
(951) 928-7791
(951) 344-8211 FAX

LAS VEGAS OFFICE
7670 WEST LAKE MEAD BLVD.
SUITE 225
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89128
(702) 258-6665
(702) 258-6662 FAX

ARIZONA OFFICE
3877 NORTH 7th STREET
SUITE 340
PHOENIX, AZ 85014
(602) 274-1204
(602) 274-1205 FAX

IN MEMORIAM
PAUL HENRY JOHNSON
(1937 – 2006)

January 18, 2007

VIA ELECTRONIC SERVICE - ESSTA

Cindy B. Greenbaum
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Trademark Trials and Appeals Board
P.O. Box 1451
Alexandria, VA 22313

Re: Arturo Santana Gallego v. Santana's Grill, Inc. (TTAB)/Santana's Grill, Inc. v. Arturo Santana Lee et. al.

BWB&O Client:	Santana's Grill, Inc.
Cancellation Proceeding No.:	92043152
BWB&O File No.:	1174.272
Subject:	**Motion for Default Judgment**

Dear Ms. Greenbaum:

Please find attached a copy of Registrant's Motion for Judgment pursuant to Trademark Rule 2.132(a) and Declaration of Michael A. Sandstrum, with supporting documents, which was deposited with the United States Post Office via Certified Mail and addressed to Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, P.O. Box 1451, Alexandria, VA 22313 on December 7, 2006.

Upon a review of the TTABVUE Trademark Trial and Appeals Board Inquiry System for cancellation proceeding 92043152, Registrant's moving papers are not reflected

as received. To ensure that the Board has a copy of all papers in support and in opposition to the pending Motion for Judgment, Registrant hereby submits another copy of its moving papers via electronic transmission.

Very truly yours,

BREMER WHYTE BROWN & O'MEARA LLP

Michael A. Sandstrum

msandstrum@bremerandwhyte.com
MAS:ms

Enclosure: Motion for Judgment; Declaration of Michael A. Sandstrum

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Nicole Whyte, Esq.
Michael Sandstrum, Esq.
Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara, LLP
20320 S.W. Birch Street, Second Floor
Newport Beach, CA 92660
(949) 221-1000
(949) 221-1001 (Fax)

Attorney for Registrant
SANTANA'S GRILL, INC.

IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

ARTURO SANTANA GALLEGO, Petitioner, v. SANTANA'S GRILL, INC., Registrant.	Cancellation Nos. 92043152 (Consolidated) 92043160 92043175 I hereby certify that this Motion for Default Judgment and the concurrently filed Declaration of Michael A. Sandstrum, and all marked attachments, if any, are being deposited with the United States Post Office via Certified Mail and addressed to Trademark Trial & Appeal Board, P.O. Box 1451, Alexandria, VA 22313-1451 12-7-06 Date Michael A. Sandstrum

REGISTRANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT UNDER TRADEMARK RULE 2.132(a)

Registrant, SANTANA'S GRILL, INC., hereby submits this Motion to Dismiss the Petitions to Cancel filed by Petitioner, ARTURO SANTANA GALLEGO, including Cancellation Proceeding Nos. 92043152, 92043160, and 92043175 (consolidated), on grounds that Petitioner has failed to prosecute his case. 37 C.F.R. § 2.132(a); *Procyon Pharmaceuticals*

Inc. v. Procyon Biopharma Inc., 61 USPQ2d 1542 (T.T.A.B. 2001). Specifically, Petitioner's testimony period closed on October 16, 2006 (extended from September 29, 2006) without the taking of any testimony and without the submission of any documentary evidence or otherwise to the Board. In light of Petitioner's complete failure to introduce any evidence in support of the claims asserted in the Petitions to Cancel Registration Nos. 2631458, 2682978, and 2634976, a default judgment dismissing this cancellation proceeding should be taken against Petitioner.

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner's Trial Testimonial period was set to close on September 30, 2006. However, on September 22, 2006, in lieu of taking trial testimony, Petitioner made a written settlement offer to Registrant. [Declaration of Michael A. Sandstrum ("Sandstrum Decl.") at ¶ 2] The basic terms of the settlement offer included the payment of certain monies to Petitioner in exchange for Registrant's exclusive right to use the disputed service marks/names and a dismissal of the pending action, among other terms. [Id. at Exh. A.] On the same day, Registrant confirmed its acceptance to the basic terms of Petitioner's settlement offer. [Id. at Exh. B.] In a good faith attempt to work out the details of a written Settlement Agreement and Release without prejudicing Petitioner, Registrant proposed a two-week extension of Petitioner's trial testimony period which was set to close on September 30, 2006. [Sandstrum Decl. at ¶ 3, Exh. C.] Upon receiving Petitioner's consent to the same, on September 26, 2006, *Registrant* filed a motion with the Board to extend *Petitioner's* trial testimony period to October 16, 2006. **All other dates, including Registrant's own testimony period, were requested to remain the same.** The Board granted the consent motion on October 4, 2006.

With Registrant's 30-day testimony period set to open on October 30, 2006, Registrant made every effort to finalize the terms of the Settlement Agreement before the commencement of its testimony period. On September 25, 2006, September 26, 2006, September 27, 2006 and October 4, 2006, Registrant sent written correspondence to Petitioner with draft language for the written Settlement Agreement and requested Petitioner's comments/proposed language regarding the same. [Sandstrum Decl. at ¶ 4, Exh. D.] However, Petitioner failed to respond to Registrant's repeated requests for draft language to incorporate into the Settlement Agreement.

On October 10, 2006, without sending any comments or proposed language to Registrant, Petitioner requested that Registrant forward a copy of its proposed settlement agreement so that, in the words of Petitioner, "we can wrap this up." [Sandstrum Decl. at ¶ 5, Exh. E.] In response, on October 12, 2006, Registrant emailed Petitioner a copy of its draft Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release ("Agreement") and requested that Petitioner advise of any comments as soon as possible. [Sandstrum Decl. at ¶ 6, Exh. F.] On October 19, 2006, still having heard nothing from Petitioner, Registrant sent another email to Petitioner requesting Petitioner's comments to the Settlement Agreement noting that time is of the essence with the Registrant's impending trial testimonial period set to open the following month. [Sandstrum Decl. at ¶ 7, Exh. G.]

It was not until October 27, 2006 that Petitioner responded to the draft Agreement sent by Registrant on October 12, 2006. [Sandstrum Decl. at ¶ 8, Exh. H.] By email dated October 27, 2006, Petitioner confirmed that "the agreement is fine as is." [Id.] The only issue that arose was in connection with Petitioner's request of Registrant to share in the costs of transcribing the Settlement Agreement from English to Spanish. [Id.] However, again on October 31, 2006,

Petitioner reassured Registrant that Petitioner is "agreeable on the material points" of the written Agreement. [Id.]

On November 2, 2006, Registrant confirmed via e-mail to Petitioner that Petitioner approved the written Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release prepared by Registrant. [Sandstrum Decl. at ¶ 9, Exh. I.] Registrant attached yet another copy of the Agreement to the e-mail for transcription by Petitioner with only minor revisions to the dates and a request for a physical address for "Notice" issues to be incorporated into the Agreement. [Id.]

On November 6, 2006 and November 7, 2006, with no response from Petitioner, Registrant sent yet another email to Registrant emphasizing the need to finalize the Agreement to avoid further disruption to Registrant's business plans. [Sandstrum Decl. at ¶ 10, Exh. J.] Registrant continued to request that the Agreement be fully executed as soon as possible, and after not received a response gave Petitioner until November 10, 2006.

Due to the substantial delay on the party of the Petitioner, on November 7, 2006, over six weeks since the tentative settlement had been reached on September 22, 2006, and in an effort to protect its interests, **Registrant obtained the consent of Petitioner to file a motion to extend the close of Registrant's testimony period to December 21, 2006.** [Sandstrum Decl. at ¶ 11] The consent motion was granted by the Board on November 8, 2006. [Id.] The Petitioner's trial testimonial period had already lapsed on October 16, 2006, and no request was made by Petitioner to extend his trial testimonial period. In turn, as noted above, Registrant, sought the consent of Petitioner to extend its trial testimonial period until December 21, 2006.

After receiving nothing on November 10, 2006, and with Registrant's approaching testimony period, on November 13, 2006, Registrant sent written correspondence to Petitioner demanding that Petitioner's signatures to the Agreement be received by Registrant no later than November 15, 2006. [Sandstrum Decl. at ¶ 12, Exh. K.] Registrant noted that if signatures were not received by end of business day on November 15, 2006, $5,000.00 would be deducted from the agreed upon settlement amount for every week that the agreement remains unsigned. [Id.] In response, on November 14, 2006, Petitioner affirmed that Petitioner's signatures to the Agreement would be received by Friday, November 17, 2006, and sent Fed-Ex to Registrant for delivery on Monday, November 20, 2006. [Sandstrum Decl. at ¶ 13, Exh. L.] Then, on November 17, 2006, Petitioner confirmed that the translation had been received and that Petitioner's signatures would be delivered one day later to Registrant via facsimile on Tuesday, November 21, 2006. [Sandstrum Decl. at ¶ 14, Exh. M.] Yet again on November 20, 2006, Petitioner's counsel again confirmed that they should have signatures by November 21, 2006. [Sandstrum Decl. at ¶ 15, Exh. N.]

However, at end of business day on November 21, 2006, Registrant had still not received any signatures from Petitioner prompting yet another email by Registrant to Petitioner notifying Petitioner that signatures had not been received as promised. [Sandstrum Decl. at ¶ 16, Exh. O.] On November 22, 2006, Registrant's counsel replied that one of her clients had been delayed on a trip to Mexico and that all signatures would be received today (November 22, 2006) and would be sent via facsimile or email scan as soon as received. [Id.].

Despite Registrant's diligent efforts, by November 28, 2006, Registrant still had not received Petitioner's signatures to the Agreement. [Sandstrum Decl. at ¶ 17, Exh. P.] On

November 29, 2006, Petitioner's counsel revealed that an undisclosed significant problem had arose which may require that Petitioner's counsel withdraw as counsel of record for Petitioner. [Sandstrum Decl. at ¶ 18] Registrant immediately notified Petitioner on November 29, 2006 that Registrant's testimony period had already commenced (set to close on December 21, 2006) and requested that Petitioner immediately advise Registrant of the status of signatures/settlement so that appropriate action could be taken, including possibly filing a motion to dismiss pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 2.132. [Sandstrum Decl. at ¶ 18, Exh. Q.] As of the filing of this Motion for Judgment on December 7, 2006, **Petitioner has not responded to Registrant's request for a status of signatures/settlement prompting Registrant to file this motion for dismissal.**

Registrant respectfully requests that the Board grant the instant motion and enter default judgment dismissing the cancellation proceedings against Petitioner. Alternatively, if the Board decides to deny Registrant's instant motion to dismiss, Registrant requests that the Board reset its Trial Testimonial period to close March 31, 2007, and keep Petitioner's testimonial period closed. 37 C.F.R. § 2.132

II. PETITIONER'S FAILURE TO PRESENT ITS CASE IN CHIEF WITHIN THE ESTABLISHED TESTIMONIAL PERIOD IS GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL UNDER 37 CFR § 2.132(a).

Dismissal is appropriate under 37 CFR § 2.132 (a) where Petitioner has completely failed to take any trial testimony and has failed to submit any evidence to the Board via Notice of Reliance during the proscribed testimony period, absent a showing of good cause. Specifically, Trademark Rule 2.132(a) provides as follows:

> (a) If the time for taking testimony by any party in the position of plaintiff has expired and that party has not taken testimony or offered any other evidence, any party in the position of defendant may, without waiving the right to offer evidence in the event the motion is denied, move for dismissal on the ground of the failure of the plaintiff to prosecute. The party in the position of plaintiff shall have fifteen days from the date of service of the motion to show cause why judgment should not be rendered against him. In the absence of a showing of good and sufficient cause, judgment may be rendered against the party in the position of plaintiff. If the motion is denied, testimony periods will be reset for the party in the position of defendant and for rebuttal.

Here, Petitioner's trial testimony period expired on October 16, 2006 per the consent motion filed by Registrant on September 26, 2006 and approved and ordered by the Board on October 4, 2006. [Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Board's order granting an extension of Petitioner's Testimony Period to October 16, 2006]. Considering Petitioner's failure to offer any testimony or documentary evidence in support of its Petition to Cancel, a dismissal of the petition is warranted. See *Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. F.G. Furniture Co., Inc.*, 190 USPQ 431, 434 (T.T.A.B. 1976) ("Since the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion in the usual case - and because Trademark Rule 2.132 so provides - the plaintiff may be non-suited in the event it fails to provide sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case.").

It is Petitioner that has the burden of proving his case and tendering the necessary evidence to the Board and defendant in support of his claims. *Id.*; see also 37 CFR § 2.121(b)(1). In those cases where petitioner has failed to present its case in chief, Trademark Rule 2.132 has been implemented. As stated in *Litton Business Systems, Inc.*, the purpose of Rule 2.132 is "to save the defendant from the expense and delay of presenting evidence and a brief and awaiting a decision if and when it is apparent that plaintiff has dropped the matter or has failed to present a prima facie case." *Id.* Where as here, Petitioner has not taken any testimony or submitted any

evidence during his testimony period, Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of proof and thus cannot prevail on his claims. See *Pumpkin Ltd. v. Seed Corps*, 43 USPQ2d 1582, 1588 (T.T.A.B. 1997).

A. Interests Of Judicial Economy Weigh Heavily In Favor Of Dismissing The Claims Asserted By Petitioner In Its Petition To Cancel

While the law does favor judgments on the merits, it is also true that adherence to and enforcement of procedural deadlines by the Patent and Trademark Office is necessary and justifiable. *Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Olympus Corp.* 18 USPQ2d 1710 (T.T.A.B. 1991). In fact, in decisions of the Board involving the issue of excusable neglect, the Board has found that the most dominant factors to consider in determining whether excusable neglect exists are: (1) the reasons for not adhering to the proscribed testimony period and, (2) the resultant delay created and its potential impact on judicial proceedings. *Pumpkin Ltd. v. Seed Corps*, 43 USPQ2d 1582, 1586 (T.T.A.B. 1997); See also *Atlanta-Fulton County Zoo Inc. v. DePalma*, 45 USPQ2d 1858 (T.T.A.B. 1998) (finding that opposer's negligent failure to comply with the set trial schedule and the resultant adverse impact on the orderly administration of the case was inexcusable).

Here, Petitioner was put on notice of the controlling trial deadlines on multiple occasions. On May 5, 2006, this Board granted Registrant's motion to extend the trial testimony periods of both Petitioner and Registrant. [Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the Board's ruling dated May 5, 2006]. Pursuant to the May 5, 2006 Board ruling, Petitioner's 30-day testimony period was set to close on September 30, 2006.

Then, on September 25, 2006, in light of the tentative settlement agreement reached between Petitioner and Registrant, Registrant agreed to file a consent motion to extend the close of Petitioner's trial testimony period from September 30, 2006 to October 16, 2006. [Sandstrum Decl. at ¶ 3, Exh. C]. The Board granted the motion on October 4, 2006 and notice of the ruling was electronically served on Petitioner by the Board on the same day. [Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the Board's ruling dated October 4, 2006].

Thus, Petitioner had ample notice of its 30-day trial testimony period. Despite knowledge of the closing date, Petitioner's testimony period came and went and Petitioner failed to introduce any evidence on his behalf. It was wholly within Petitioner's control to either offer testimony during the assigned period <u>or</u> move for an extension of its trial testimony period. Registrant is not aware of any reason for Petitioner's failure to take the necessary precautions other than an undisclosed "problem" of which Registrant was not made aware until after the opening of its own testimony period. [Sandstrum Decl. at ¶ 18]. Such an unexplained delay does not constitute good cause under 37 CFR 2.132(a). See *Procyon Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Procyon Biopharma, Inc.*, 61 USPQ 2d 1542, 1543 (T.T.A.B. 2001) ("the Board has found that mere unexplained delay in initiating action in an affected time period does not constitute good cause" (citing *Luehrmann v. Kwik Kopy Corp.*, 2 USPQ2d 1303 (T.T.A.B. 1987)).

Petitioner's failure to abide by the timeline assigned by the board is detrimental to the orderly administration of inter parte proceedings. See *Atlanta-Fulton County Zoo Inc. v. DePalma*, 45 USPQ2d 1858, 1860 (T.T.A.B. 1998). Moreover, Petitioner's complete disregard for the timelines imposed by the Board creates undue delay and a strain on the Board's limited resources. See generally, *Notice of Final Rulemaking*, 63 FR 48081 (September 9, 1998)

(discussion regarding the purpose of inter parte rules designed to promote expeditious prosecution and defense of cases without undue delay).

Further, Registrant has been prejudiced by the unreasonable delay caused by Petitioner's actions, including without limitation, the expenditure of substantial time, attorneys' fees and expenses in preparing for the Trial Testimonial periods during the time period just prior to Petitioner's settlement offer to Registrant. Due to the dilatory actions of Petitioner in continuing to promise Registrant that the Settlement Agreement was agreeable and that signatures would be forthcoming, and Registrant's reliance upon the same, it has been several months since Registrant and Registrant's counsel have prepared for the Trial Testimony periods. As a result, the initial preparation time expended by Registrant and Registrant's counsel has been lost. In the event that the instant motion is denied, Registrant and Registrant's counsel will be required to expend substantial additional time, attorneys' fees and expenses to re-prepare (gear up) for the Trial Testimonial period.

B. <u>The Board Has Discretion To Grant Registrant's Motion Even After The Commencement of Registrant's Testimony Period</u>

Pursuant to 37 CFR § 2.132 (c), the Board, in its discretion, may grant a motion to dismiss under 2.132(a) after the commencement of defendant's testimony period. In pertinent part, 37 CFR § 2.132(c) provides as follows:

> (c) A motion filed under paragraph (a) or (b) of this section must be filed before the opening of the testimony period of the moving party, *except that the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board may in its discretion grant a motion under paragraph (a) even if the motion was filed after the opening of the testimony*

period of the moving party.

On the facts of this case, the interests of justice and judicial economy favor the granting of this motion despite the motion being filed after the opening of Registrant's testimony period. Here, substantial time and money had been expended by Registrant in drafting the written settlement agreement, engaging in communications with Registrant regarding the settlement agreement and in verbal and written communications with Petitioner's counsel regarding the settlement agreement, all of which had been ongoing between the parties for nearly two months prior to the commencement of Registrant's testimony period, set to close on December 21, 2006. [Attached as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of the Board's ruling dated November 8, 2006] With multiple assurances from Petitioner's counsel that the written Settlement Agreement was acceptable to Petitioner and that Petitioner's signatures were forthcoming, Registrant did not proceed with its testimony period which opened on November 21, 2006. Moreover, it was not until after the commencement of Registrant's testimony period, on November 29, 2006, that Petitioner advised of a significant problem, possibly requiring Petitioner's counsel to withdraw from further representation. [Sandstrum Decl. at ¶ 18]. Since November 29, 2006, Petitioner has not responded to Registrant's requests for signatures nor Registrant's notice of intent to file the instant motion. [Id.]

III. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that the Board grant Registrant's Motion to Dismiss the claims asserted by Petitioner in its Petitions to Cancel Registration Nos. 2631458, 2682978, and 2634976 [Cancellation Proceeding Nos. 92043152,

92043160, and 92043175 (consolidated)]. Alternatively, in the event the Board denies Registrant's instant motion to dismiss, Registrant requests that the Board reset its Trial Testimonial period to close March 31, 2007, and keep Petitioner's testimonial period closed. 37 C.F.R. § 2.132

Dated: December 7, 2006

BREMER WHYTE BROWN & O'MEARA LLP

By: _____

Nicole Whyte, Esq.
Michael A. Sandstrum, Esq.
Attorneys for Registrant
SANTANA'S GRILL, INC.

PROOF OF SERVICE

I am employed in the County of Orange, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 20320 S.W. Birch Street, Second Floor, Newport Beach, California 92660.

On December 7, 2006, I served the within document(s) described as:

REGISTRANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT UNDER TRADEMARK RULE 2.132(a)

on the interested parties in this action as stated on the attached mailing list.

[X] (BY MAIL) By placing a true copy of the foregoing document(s) in a sealed envelope addressed as set forth on the attached mailing list. I placed each such envelope for collection and mailing following ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with this Firm's practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing. Under that practice, the correspondence would be deposited with the United States Postal Service on that same day, with postage thereon fully prepaid at Newport Beach, California, in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.

I certify that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this Court at whose direction the service was made.

Executed on December 7, 2006, at Newport Beach, California.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Kristie Elliott
(Type or print name)

(Signature)

BREMER WHYTE BROWN & O'MEARA LLP
20320 S.W. BIRCH STREET
SECOND FLOOR
NEWPORT BCH, CA. 92660
(949) 221-1000

Santana's Grill, Inc. v. Arturo Castaneda, et al.

Case No. 03 CV 2340 6 (RBB)

BWB&O CLIENT: **Santana's Grill, Inc., Claudia Vallarta-Santana**
BWB&O FILE NO.: **1177.272**

SERVICE LIST

M. Chris Armenta, Esq. The Armenta Law Firm, P.C. 233 Wilshire Blvd, Suite 400 Santa Monica, CA 90401 (310) 917-1026 (310) 917-1027 Fax	~~Frederick S. Berretta, Esq.~~ ~~KNOBBE MARTENS~~ ~~OLSON & BEAR~~ ~~550 West C Street, Suite 1200~~ ~~San Diego, CA 92101~~ ~~(619) 235-8550~~ ~~(619) 235-0716 Fax~~	

BREMER WHYTE BROWN & O'MEARA LLP
20320 S.W. BIRCH STREET
SECOND FLOOR
NEWPORT BCH, CA 92660
(949) 221-1000

EXHIBIT "A"

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
P.O. Box 1451
Alexandria, VA 22313-1451

Mailed: October 4, 2006

Cancellation No. 92043152
92043160
92043175

ARTURO SANTANA GALLEGO

v.

SANTANA'S GRILL, INC.

Karl Kochersperger, Paralegal

Respondent's consented motion filed September 26, 2006 to extend testimony periods is granted. Trademark Rule 2.127(a).

Testimony periods are reset in accordance with respondent's motion.

EXHIBIT "B"

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
P.O. Box 1451
Alexandria, VA 22313-1451

Mailed: May 5, 2006

Cancellation No. 92043152
92043160
92043175

ARTURO SANTANA GALLEGO

v.

SANTANA'S GRILL, INC.

Karl Kochersperger, Paralegal

Respondent's consented request to extend testimony periods filed April 27, 2006 is granted as corrected.

Accordingly, trial dates are reset as follows:

THE PERIOD FOR DISCOVERY TO CLOSE:	CLOSED
30-day testimony period for party in position of plaintiff to close:	September 30, 2006
30-day testimony period for party in position of defendant to close:	November 29, 2006
15-day rebuttal testimony period to close:	January 13, 2007

In each instance, a copy of the transcript of testimony together with copies of documentary exhibits, must be served on the adverse party within thirty days after completion of the taking of testimony. Trademark Rule 2.125.

Briefs shall be filed in accordance with Trademark Rule 2.128(a) and (b).

An oral hearing will be set only upon request filed as provided by Trademark Rule 2.129.

EXHIBIT "C"

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
P.O. Box 1451
Alexandria, VA 22313-1451

Mailed: October 4, 2006

Cancellation No. 92043152
92043160
92043175

ARTURO SANTANA GALLEGO

v.

SANTANA'S GRILL, INC.

Karl Kochersperger, Paralegal

Respondent's consented motion filed September 26, 2006 to extend testimony periods is granted. Trademark Rule 2.127(a).

Testimony periods are reset in accordance with respondent's motion.

EXHIBIT "D"

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
P.O. Box 1451
Alexandria, VA 22313-1451

Mailed: November 8, 2006

Cancellation No. 92043152
92043160
92043175

ARTURO SANTANA GALLEGO

v.

SANTANA'S GRILL, INC.

Karl Kochersperger, Paralegal

Respondent's consented motion filed November 7, 2006 to extend testimony periods is granted. Trademark Rule 2.127(a).

Testimony periods are reset in accordance with respondent's motion.