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Leo Stoller

Leo Stoller
December 14, 2001
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12-18-2001
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**IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD**

LEO STOLLER D/B/A
CENTRAL MFG.
P O Box 35189
Chicago, IL 60707-0189
Opposer,

vs.

THIRD MILLENNIUM TECHNOLOGY, INC.
(an Alabama corporation)
6417-E Hillcrest Park Ct.
Mobile, Alabama 36695
Applicant.

Opposition No: 115,931
Trademark: CENTRALITE
Application SN: 75-492,793
Int. Class No: 09

Published: June 29, 1999

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MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION §2.127¹

The Opposer requests that the Board² reconsider and reverse, as a matter of law, the Board's Order of Dec. 7, 2001 (Exh. 1) sanctioning the Opposer and/or Leo Stoller and to dismiss this case pursuant to the Opposer's Request to Withdraw the Opposition filed on May 10, 2000 "pursuant to the terms and conditions of a settlement agreement entered into the parties on March 31, 2000". See paragraph 1 of Opposer' Request to Withdraw the Opposition marked as Exh. 2.

1. The representative of the Opposer Leo Stoller sought procedural advice from Chief Judge David Sams on December 14, 2001. Judge Sams said, "If I have a problem with the order I should file a Motion for Reconsideration".

2. The Board issued an Order dated Dec 7, 2001 Before Cissel, Quinn and Rogers, Administrative Trademark Judges. *ExH 1*

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A motion for reconsideration is a device that may be used to demonstrate that, based on the facts before the Board when it issued its order and on the applicable law, the Board's ruling is in error and requires appropriate change. The motion may not be used to introduce into the record facts which were previously known and which could have been presented earlier. *See* Trademark Rule 2.127(b) and TBMP § 518.

Opposer asserts that its request for reconsideration falls squarely within the parameters in which the Board must as a matter of law reconsider and reverse its Dec. 7, 2001 Order.

Quoting from the first page of the Board's Dec. 7, 2001 Order Before Judges Cissel, Quinn and Roberts:

This case now comes up for consideration of applicant's March 20, 2000 motion to dismiss on the ground that opposer improperly obtained extensions of the opposition period and, therefore, the notice of opposition should not be considered timely filed. Opposer has not filed any response to applicant's motion to dismiss. Trademark rule 2.127(a) provides that when a party fails to file a brief in response to a motion, the motion may be treated as conceded. Accordingly, in this case it is appropriate to treat applicant's motion to dismiss as conceded. However, insofar as the motion alleges that "opposer made material misrepresentations" to the Board when requesting extensions of the opposition period, we also find it appropriate to consider the question whether opposer should be subjected to a sanction under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and/or the Board's inherent authority. It is in regard to this latter consideration that we shall briefly review the history of this proceeding.¹

THE BOARD ABUSED IT DISCRETION AND/OR ERRORED IN IT'S FINDING SANCTIONING LEO STOLLER CONTAINED IN THE SAID DEC. 7,2001 ORDER

The Board erred in their decision of Dec. 7, 2001 first, by evening consideration applicant's March 20, 2000 motion to dismiss. In view of the fact that the Opposer had on May 10, 2000 had already filed a Request to Withdraw the Opposition pursuant to the terms and conditions of a settlement agreement entered into by the parties on March 31, 2000 *See* attached

1. The Board when on to justify a sever sanction against the Opposer which under the facts and the law is completely without merit and must as a matter of law be reversed and the sanction dismissed.

Settlement agreement marked as Exh. 3.

Opposer did not file any response to applicant's March 20, 2000 motion to dismiss because the Opposer had executed a settlement agreement drafted by the Applicant on March 31, 2000.

Pursuant to the terms and conditions of a settlement agreement entered into by the parties the Opposer filed a request before the Board on May 10, 2000 stating that "Pursuant to the terms and conditions of a settlement agreement entered into by the parties on March 31, 2000, the Opposer requests that this Opposition be withdrawn." See Exh. 2,

The said settlement agreement entered into between the parties evidences that the Opposer and/or Leo Stoller did not make any misrepresentations to this Board.

Thus based upon the facts before the Board on Dec. 7, 2001 that the Opposer had filed on May 10, 2000 a request to withdraw the opposition Exh. 2. Secondly that the parties had resolved this controversy with a settlement agreement as memorialized in Opposer's said request to withdraw it was entirely unnecessary for the Board to even consider:

"applicant's March 20, 2000 motion to dismiss on the ground that opposer improperly obtained extensions of the opposition period and, therefore, the notice of opposition should not be considered timely filed. opposer has not filed any response to applicant's motion to dismiss. Trademark rule 2.127(a) provides that when a party fails to file a brief in response to a motion, the motion may be treated as conceded. Accordingly, in this case it is appropriate to treat applicant's motion to dismiss as conceded."

Secondly, based upon Opposer's request to with draw Exh. 2 it was entirely inappropriate for the Board "to treat applicant's motion to dismiss as conceded." Opposer did not concede Applicant's motion to dismiss, because this matter was settled as between the parties and the Opposer had filed a timely Request to Withdraw the said Opposition Exh. 2.

Consequently it was entirely unnecessary and unconstitutional, under the circumstances before the Board to consider any allegations that the "opposer made material misrepresentations" to the Board when requesting extensions of the opposition period". Opposer had stated that the parties were considering settlement and the parties did in fact settle this case on March 31, 2000 See Exh 3 a true and correct copy of the said settlement agreement. Under the circumstances before the Board on Dec. 7, 2001 the fact that the Opposer had filed a timely Request to Withdraw based upon a settlement on May 10, 2000, it is entirely inappropriate for the Board to

consider the question whether opposer should be subjected to a sanction under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and/or the Board's inherent authority when the Board should have merely dismissed this proceeding based upon the Opposer Request to Withdraw the Opposition.

WHEREFORE the Opposer prays that the Board reconsider and reverse it's Order of Dec. 7, 2001 dismissing this case based upon Opposer May 10, 2000 Request to Withdraw the Opposition and to rescind any sanction placed upon Leo Stoller and/or any of the companies that he represents before the Board as outlined in the Board's Dec. 7, 2001 Order.

By: Leo Stoller, Opposer
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Dated: December 14, 2001

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that this document is being deposited with the United States Postal Service, via first class mail postage prepaid, addressed to:

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Leo Stoller
Leo Stoller December 14, 2001

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2900 Crystal Drive
Arlington, Virginia 22202-3513

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PAT. & T.M. OFFICE

Opposition No. 115,931

Central Mfg. Inc.

v.

Third Millenium Technology,
Inc.

Before Cissel, Quinn, and Rogers, Administrative Trademark
Judges.

By the Board.

This case now comes up for consideration of applicant's March 20, 2000 motion to dismiss on the ground that opposer improperly obtained extensions of the opposition period and, therefore, the notice of opposition should not be considered timely filed. Opposer has not filed any response to applicant's motion to dismiss. Trademark Rule 2.127(a) provides that when a party fails to file a brief in response to a motion, the motion may be treated as conceded. Accordingly, in this case it is appropriate to treat applicant's motion to dismiss as conceded. However, insofar as the motion alleges that "[o]pposer made material misrepresentations" to the Board when requesting extension of the opposition period, we also find it appropriate to

EXH 1

Opposition No. 115,931

consider the question whether opposer should be subjected to a sanction under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and/or the Board's inherent authority. It is in regard to this latter consideration that we shall briefly review the history of this proceeding.

Procedural Background

The involved application was published for opposition on June 29, 1999. Opposer Central Mfg. Inc., a Delaware corporation acting through its president, Leo Stoller, filed four requests to extend its time to oppose the involved application.¹ In the motion to dismiss, applicant does not dispute the Board's approval of opposer's first two extension requests, which resulted in extension of the opposition period until October 27, 1999. Rather, applicant focuses on opposer's third and fourth extension requests.

The Board approved the third and fourth extension requests in accordance with Trademark Rule 2.102(c), because opposer stated in the caption of each request that applicant "agreed" to the proposed extension of time and because opposer affirmatively represented in each request that the parties were engaged in settlement discussions.²

¹ Application Serial No. 74/492,793. Opposer's requests to extend time to oppose were filed on July 20, 1999; July 26, 1999; August 3, 1999; and November 15, 1999.

² On September 1, 1999, the Board issued an action that expressly approved the third extension request, notified opposer that the Board would not extend the time for filing a notice of opposition

Opposition No. 115,931

On January 6, 2000, opposer Central Mfg. Inc. filed its notice of opposition to the registration of applicant's mark, which commenced this proceeding within the extended opposition period. Consequently, the Board issued an order, on February 7, 2000, formally instituting this opposition and naming Central Mfg. Inc. as the opposer [plaintiff].

Presumably before applicant received its copies of the Board's institution order and the notice of opposition, applicant on February 22, 2000 filed a request that the Board refuse to grant any further extensions of time to oppose.³ In this request, applicant contends that:

" . . . the assertions concerning settlement negotiations made by the potential opposer have no basis in fact, and appear to be made solely for the purpose of delaying registration of applicant's mark.

In fact, there are no negotiations of any kind or discussions between the applicant herein and the potential opposer, Central Mfg. [sic]; to the contrary, the applicant has refused and continues to refuse to enter into any negotiations or discussions with the potential opposer."

for an inordinate period, allowed opposer until November 26, 1999 to file its notice of opposition, and indicated that opposer could file a further request to extend time if settlement had not concluded by that date. The fourth extension request, filed within the time permitted by the Board's September 1, 1999 action, was separately granted by the Board on November 18, 1999, and extended the deadline for opposition until February 24, 2000.

³ Because applicant's February 22, 2000 filing does not include proof of service of a copy thereof on opposer, a copy is forwarded to opposer with its copy of this order.

Opposition No. 115,931

Inasmuch as opposer filed its last extension request on November 15, 1999, the February 22, 2000 request to deny additional extensions of time to oppose is moot.⁴

On January 31, 2000, opposer's president filed a proposed amended notice of opposition in his own name, specifically listing "Leo Stoller dba Central Mfg." as opposer. Because it was not associated with the Board's file for this proceeding until after issuance of the institution order, the proposed pleading was not previously considered. The proposed amended notice of opposition is nearly identical to the original notice of opposition and appears to be nothing more than an attempt to substitute "Leo Stoller dba Central Mfg." for "Central Mfg. Inc." as party plaintiff herein. Therefore, the "amended" notice is, in essence, a motion to substitute. The motion is moot, however, because we are dismissing this proceeding.⁵

Opposer's Alleged Misconduct

We now turn to the specific allegations regarding opposer's conduct made in applicant's motion to dismiss and/or the accompanying affidavit of applicant's vice

⁴ Had applicant promptly filed written objections, the Board might have been able to consider such objections prior to institution of this proceeding. See TBMP §§210 and 211.01.

⁵ Also moot is applicant's request for issuance of an expedited registration. Moreover, since applicant's application is based on the intent-to-use provisions of the Lanham Act, a Notice of Allowance, not a registration, will issue in due course, following dismissal of this proceeding.

Opposition No. 115,931

president of finance, James Busby. Applicant maintains that opposer's third and fourth extension requests were based on false allegations and material misrepresentations of fact. Applicant rejects as untrue the representation made in opposer's third and fourth extension requests that applicant "agreed" to each, denies that the parties were ever engaged in bilateral settlement negotiations, and denies the allegation in each request that applicant invited opposer to proffer a settlement proposal.⁶ Further, applicant asserts that, rather than engage in legitimate settlement negotiations, "opposer was engaged in delaying issuance of applicant's registration to force applicant to pay money to opposer in exchange for allowing applicant's registration to issue."

Applicant has shown that opposer sent three letters to applicant -- two prior to opposer's filing of the notice of opposition and one shortly thereafter -- and applicant maintains that opposer, through those letters, attempted to coerce applicant into taking a license or abandoning applicant's application. Moreover, applicant contends that opposer's third letter contains a number of exaggerations, threatens that the opposition proceeding will be prolonged and costly, and threatens that applicant's business will be

⁶ To support these contentions, applicant relies on the Busby affidavit, with exhibits.

Opposition No. 115,931

financially ruined if applicant does not capitulate. These letters, applicant contends, support applicant's assertion that the parties were not engaged in bilateral settlement negotiations.⁷ Finally, applicant asserts that it did not respond to any of opposer's letters. Opposer, not having responded to the motion to dismiss, has not contested any of applicant's contentions.

Inasmuch as applicant has shown that it was not discussing settlement with opposer and did not agree to the proposed extensions, applicant has refuted the representations of fact made by opposer in its third and fourth requests to extend the opposition period. Thus, it is clear that these two extension requests were based on untruths and were filed in bad faith for the improper purpose of obtaining a benefit from the Board to which opposer was not entitled.

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, in pertinent part, as follows:

(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, --

- (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause

⁷ The letters are on opposer's letterhead, signed by "Leo Stoller, Agent."

unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;

...

(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the ... parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.

(1) How Initiated. ...

(B) On Court's Initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing [a] ... party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto.

The quoted provisions of Federal Rule 11 apply to pleadings, motions, and other papers filed in inter partes proceedings before the Board. See Trademark Rule 2.116(a) and authorities cited in TBMP §529.01. Moreover, in considering whether the conduct of a party relating to the filing of a notice of opposition is sanctionable, either under Rule 11 or the Board's inherent authority, the Board will consider not only the notice of opposition itself, but also the requests to extend the time to oppose, which obviously affect the timeliness of the notice of opposition.⁸

⁸ The Supreme Court has held that bad faith is not limited to instances in which a complaint is filed in bad faith, but that conduct in the course of litigation may also constitute bad faith. *Hall v. Cole*, 412 U.S. 1, 15, 93 S.Ct. 1943, 36 L.Ed.2d 702 (1973).

Opposition No. 115,931

When sanctionable conduct is found, although the Board does not impose monetary sanctions or award attorneys' fees or other expenses,⁹ the Board has authority to enter other appropriate sanctions, up to and including the entry of judgment. See Trademark Rule §2.116(a) and authorities cited in TBMP §529.01. If the Board finds that a party has violated Rule 11, the Board may impose an appropriate sanction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, and *Giant Food, Inc. v. Standard Terry Mills, Inc.*, 231 USPQ 626 (TTAB 1986). Further, it is clear that Rule 11 does not displace the Board's inherent authority to sanction bad-faith conduct. See *Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.*, 501 U.S. 32, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27, rehearing denied, 501 U.S. 1269, 112 S.Ct. 12, 115 L.Ed.2d 1097 (1991). See also, *United States v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters*, 948 F.2d 1338, 1345 (2d Cir. 1991), citing *Chambers*, 501 U.S. at 49 (A court's inherent power to sanction those before it "stems from the very nature of courts and their need to be able to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of the cases.").

One of the predominant purposes for entering a Rule 11 sanction is to deter further wrongdoing. See authorities collected in Wright & Miller, *Federal Practice and*

⁹ See Trademark Rules 2.120(f), 2.120(g)(1), 2.120(h) and 2.127(f), and TBMP §502.06.

Opposition No. 115,931

Procedure: Civil 2d §1336 (1990; 2001 supplement). The Board has discretion to tailor sanctions appropriate to the violations and may consider any measure designed to serve this purpose. *Id.*; See also, *Electronic Industries Association v. Potega*, 50 USPQ2d 1775 (TTAB 1999); and authorities discussed in Alan S. Cooper, *Managing the Board's Increasing Workload: The Creative Use of Sanctions*, 88 Trademark Rep. 43 (1998). These principles are equally applicable when the Board employs its inherent authority to sanction bad-faith conduct.

The authority to sanction a pro se party is manifestly clear, and the Supreme Court has held that the Rule 11 certification standard for a party is the same as that for an attorney. *Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc.*, 498 U.S. 533, 547, 111 S.Ct. 922, 112 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1991); see also, Patent and Trademark Rule 10.18(b). Moreover, the drafters of Rule 11 clearly stated that any "sanction should be imposed on the persons -- whether attorneys, law firms, or parties -- who have violated the rule or who may be determined to be responsible for the violation." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note on 1993 revisions to subdivisions (b) and (c). See also, *Business Guides*, 498 U.S. at 546-47:

We held in *Pavelic & LeFlore* that Rule 11 contemplates sanctions against the particular individual who signs his or her name, not against the law firm of which that individual is a member,

Opposition No. 115,931

because "the purpose of Rule 11 as a whole is to bring home to the individual signer his personal, nondelegable responsibility . . . to validate the truth and legal reasonableness of the papers filed." 493 U.S. at 126. This is entirely consistent with our decision here that a represented party who signs his or her name bears a personal, nondelegable responsibility to certify the truth and reasonableness of the document.

The Supreme Court, however, did not squarely address the question whether, when an officer of a corporation signs a paper on behalf of the corporation, both the corporate party and the individual officer that signs the document may be held jointly or severally liable for any violation of Rule 11. See *Business Guides*, 498 U.S. at 547-48, wherein the dissent criticized the majority for treating the signature of the president of a corporation as made by the party rather than the individual; the majority pointed out that question was not raised in the proceeding below.

At least one court has held that, under Rule 11, an individual who is not himself a party but signs a document as an officer of a corporation cannot himself be held liable, because Rule 11 applies only to parties and attorneys of record, and that such a proposition does not run counter to *Business Guides*. See *Leventhal v. New Valley Corp.*, 148 F.R.D. 109, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).

The *Leventhal* court's distinction regarding Rule 11 does not, however, mean that an individual officer of a corporate party can avoid any personal liability for

Opposition No. 115,931

deliberate misrepresentations. The *Leventhal* court recognized the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of the inherent power to sanction bad-faith conduct:

The Supreme Court has recently said that the trial court's inherent power to impose sanctions for bad-faith conduct is 'broader and narrower than other means of imposing sanctions,' and 'must continue to exist to fill the interstices.' *Chambers v. NASCO* [citations omitted].

Leventhal, 148 F.R.D. at 111.

In *Chambers*, the Supreme Court also stated:

There is ... nothing in the other sanctioning mechanisms or prior cases interpreting them that warrants a conclusion that a federal court may not, as a matter of law, resort to its inherent power to impose attorney's fees as a sanction for bad-faith conduct. This is plainly the case where the conduct at issue is not covered by one of the sanctioning provisions. ... If in the informed discretion of the court, neither the statute nor the Rules are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent power.

Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50.

In this case, Leo Stoller, as the only individual to sign any paper on behalf of opposer Central Mfg. Inc., is solely responsible for the misrepresentations included in the requests to extend the opposition period. While it is unclear under *Business Guides* whether Leo Stoller, as an individual, is subject to sanction under Rule 11, we need not decide the question. It is clear that he is subject to sanction under the Board's inherent authority to sanction bad-faith conduct.

Opposition No. 115,931

By signing and filing the August 3, 1999 and November 15, 1999 extension requests for opposer, with their included misrepresentations, Leo Stoller acted in bad faith and for improper purposes, i.e., to obtain additional time to harass applicant, to obtain unwarranted extensions of the opposition period, and to waste resources of applicant and the Board. Furthermore, we note that this Board has previously sanctioned another corporation headed by Leo Stoller for precisely this type of conduct, i.e., for making misrepresentations regarding the existence of settlement negotiations between one of his corporations and an applicant.¹⁰ See *S Industries, Inc. v. S & W Sign Company, Inc. d/b/a Westview Instruments* (Opposition No. 102,907, Dec. 16, 1999). See also, *S. Industries Inc. v. Lamb-Weston Inc.*, 45 USPQ2d 1293 (TTAB 1997), wherein petitioner's certificate of mailing on a motion to extend was found to be fraudulent. The Board cannot ignore its past experience with Leo Stoller and considers the bad-faith actions taken in this case against that backdrop. See *In re ITEL*

¹⁰ Leo Stoller and his various corporations are regularly before the Board and courts. See *S Industries Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc.*, 45 USPQ2d 1293 (TTAB 1997) (petitioner's motion to extend based on report that its president, i.e., Leo Stoller, was involved in numerous other proceedings before the Board). See also *S Industries, Inc. v. Hobbico, Inc.*, 940 F. Supp. 210 (N.D.Ill. 1996) ("S Industries, Inc. ('S') appears to have entered into a new industry - that of instituting federal litigation. ...[A]nd this court has had occasion to note a proliferation of other actions brought by S...").

Opposition No. 115,931

Securities Litigation, 596 F.Supp. 226, 235 (D.C.Cal. 1984), affirmed 791 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1986) (District court considered offending counsel's "history in this type of litigation"). See also, *U.S. v. Barker*, 182 F.R.D. 661 (D.C.Ga. 1998).

One district court, in explaining why it would, upon submission of any further improper filings, sanction an individual appearing without counsel, stated that a court's "[o]pinions cannot only be perceived as decisions adjudicating legal problems but must also be recognized as instructive orders, that, if followed, will assist a party in future situations. A parent does not necessarily mediate arguments between his or her young children to simply quell them, but also to teach the children in the hope that they will gain a life lesson." *Mpounas v. U.S.*, 28 F.Supp.2d 856, 860-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). The *Mpounas* court also noted that the petitioner had not benefited from the instruction the court had provided in prior opinions, noted that pro se litigants have a greater capacity than others to disrupt the fair allocation of judicial resources, and observed that the court could utilize its "inherent powers to protect its jurisdiction from such vexatious conduct." *Mpounas*, 28 F.Supp.2d at 861.

We find that Leo Stoller has, in this case, twice filed papers based on false statements and material

Opposition No. 115,931

misrepresentations and, moreover, that he has engaged in a pattern of submitting such filings to this Board. We are not optimistic that Leo Stoller can be discouraged from submitting further bad-faith filings unless we impose a sanction. Regardless of whether Leo Stoller can be sanctioned under Rule 11, this is precisely the type of situation in which the exercise of inherent authority to sanction is appropriate. *Chambers*, 501 U.S. at 50.

Accordingly, we find it appropriate to sanction Leo Stoller under the Board's inherent authority. So as to tailor the sanction to the type of bad-faith conduct evidenced in this case, the sanction we impose is related to the filing of requests to extend the time to oppose a mark in a published application. Leo Stoller is hereby required, for any request for an extension of an opposition period in which it is alleged that the requested extension is on consent or has been agreed to or in which there is any allegation of any type of settlement discussion, to include written agreement from the applicant to the truth of the allegation. Such agreement shall be evidenced by the signature of the relevant applicant or, if represented, of its counsel. "The Supreme Court and numerous courts of appeals have recognized that courts may resort to restrictive measures that except from normally available procedures litigants who have abused their litigation


opportunities." *In re Martin-Trigona*, 9 F.3d 226, 228 (2d Cir. 1993). The sanction applies whenever Leo Stoller signs a covered extension request¹¹, whether on his own behalf or as officer of one of his corporations. The sanction is effective for one year from the date of this order.

As noted at the outset of this order, applicant's motion to dismiss is granted as conceded and the opposition is dismissed with prejudice. The application, based on the intent-to-use provisions of the Trademark Act, shall be released for further appropriate processing and a Notice of Allowance shall issue in due course.

¹¹ Any such extension request that does not include an allegation that it is on consent or has been agreed to or does not include a report of settlement negotiations would not be covered by this order. However, any extension request that does include any one of these allegations is a covered request, and is subject to this order, regardless of whether it is the first or a subsequent request. In other words, it is the content of the request and not the time of filing that makes it subject to the sanction.

Certification of Mailing

I hereby certify that this correspondence is being deposited with the U. S. Postal Service as first class mail in an envelope addressed to:
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Leo Stoller
May 10, 2000

**IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD**

LEO STOLLER D/B/A
CENTRAL MFG.
P O Box 35189
Chicago, IL 60707-0189
Opposer,

vs.

THIRD MILLENNIUM TECHNOLOGY, INC.
(an Alabama corporation)
6417-E Hillcrest Park Ct.
Mobile, Alabama 36695
Applicant.


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Trademark: CENTRALITE
Application SN: 75-492,793
Int. Class No: 09

Published: June 29, 1999

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REQUEST TO WITHDRAW THE OPPOSITION

Pursuant to the terms and conditions of a settlement agreement entered into by the parties on March 31, 2000, the Opposer requests that this Opposition be withdrawn.


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Dated: May 10, 2000

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Leo Stoller May 10, 2000

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EXH 2

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Mailed: May 10, 2000

Asst Commissioner of Trademarks,
2900 Crystal Drive, Arlington, VA 22202 3513

LEO STOLLER d/b/a CENTRAL MFG. v. THIRD MILLENNIUM TECHNOLOGIES *INC*

Trademark: CENTRALITE Int. Class No: 9

Application SN 75-492,793


1. REQUEST TO WITHDRAW THE OPPOSITION

REF: #208



05-30-2000

U.S. Patent & TMOfc/TM Mail RcptDt. #57



UNIVERSITY OF UTAH

20 USA

CENTRAL MFG. INC.
P O Box 35189
Chicago, IL 60707-0189

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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Consent to Registration and Covenant Not to Sue

THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, effective as of the date of the last signature affixed hereto, is by and between:

CENTRAL MFG. INC., a corporation of the State of Delaware,
P.O. Box 35189
Chicago, Illinois 60707-0189
(hereinafter "CENTRAL")

and

THIRD MILLENIUM TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a corporation of the State of Alabama
6414 Hillcrest Park
Mobile, Alabama 36695
(hereinafter "THIRD").

WITNESSETH THAT

WHEREAS **THIRD** has filed U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 75/492,793 for the mark **CENTRALITE** for low voltage electric lighting control system, consisting of computer software, electric switches, and wiring to remotely control lighting for added convenience, comfort, and safety, in International Class 9, which Application was published for opposition on June 29, 1999.

WHEREAS **CENTRAL** is the successor in interest of S Industries, Inc, P.O. Box 417-120, Chicago, Illinois, 60641-7120, and is the owner of U.S. Trademark Registrations:

<u>REG. NO.</u>	<u>REG. DATE</u>	<u>INTL. CLASS</u>
2,273,229	Aug. 31, 1999	009
2,140,524	Mar. 3, 1998	002
2,064,576	May 27, 1997	036
1,984,329	July 2, 1996	014
1,496,826	July 19, 1988	025
1,384,193	Feb. 25, 1986	012
1,361,523	Sep. 24, 1985	009, 026
1,326,765	Mar. 26, 1985	009
1,270,016	Mar. 13, 1984	028

EXH 3

and pending U.S. Applications for Trademark Registration:

<u>APPL. NO.</u>	<u>DATE FILED</u>	<u>INTL. CLASS</u>
75/228004	Jan. 6, 1997	003
75/228064	Jan. 6, 1997	020

all for the mark SENTRA, copies of which Registrations and Pending Application Summaries are attached hereto as Exhibit A, showing the Goods/Services Specified for each Registration and Application (hereinafter the "SENTRA Registrations and Applications").

WHEREAS **CENTRAL** has filed a Notice of Opposition No. 115,931 to oppose the registration of the mark **CENTRALITE** by **THIRD** based upon a likelihood of confusion between the **CENTRALITE** mark and **CENTRAL**'s **SENTRA** Registrations and Applications.

WHEREAS **CENTRAL** and **THIRD** are desirous of amicably resolving this dispute over the use of the respective marks of the parties.

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of \$2500 (two thousand, five hundred dollars) paid by **THIRD** to **CENTRAL** and in light of the foregoing and following mutual promises and understandings, it is hereby agreed by and between the parties as follows:

1. **CENTRAL** agrees to withdraw its Notice of Opposition No. 115,931 against Application Serial No. 75/492,793 and to allow this Application to proceed to registration. **CENTRAL** further agrees that it will not oppose or object in any way to **THIRD**'s use or registration of **CENTRALITE** for the goods listed in Application Serial No. 75/492,793 and agrees not to seek cancellation of the resulting registration.
2. **CENTRAL** further agrees not to sue **THIRD** for any past, present, or future infringement of **CENTRAL**'s mark **SENTRA** by **THIRD**'s use of the mark **CENTRALITE**, so long as **THIRD** complies with the terms of this Agreement.
3. **THIRD** agrees that it will not use the mark **CENTRALITE** in any form in connection with the Goods/Services Specified in the **SENTRA** Registrations and Applications, as listed above with reference to Exhibit A.
4. **THIRD** acknowledges **CENTRAL**'s exclusive ownership of the mark **SENTRA** and agrees not to sue or oppose **CENTRAL**'s applications or **CENTRAL**'s use of its **SENTRA** marks.
5. This Agreement shall be binding worldwide, and shall be binding on, and inure to the benefit of, all assigns and successors in interest to the parties hereto, and including their parents, subsidiaries, divisions, sister companies, affiliates, entities which they control, and entities which control them.

6. Each party will bear all its own costs incurred in connection with this matter. All parties hereby release all other parties, individually and collectively, from all claims, liabilities, and damages, whether known or unknown, relating to any aspect of Opposition No. 115,931 or the facts relating thereto.

7. This Agreement sets forth the entire agreement and understanding between the parties. No agreement amending the Agreement or any provisions hereof shall be valid unless in writing and signed by the party to be charged. If any portion of this Agreement is invalid or unenforceable, it shall not affect the validity or enforceability of the other provisions. The parties agree to execute such documents as may be required to effectuate the provisions of this Agreement.

8. This Agreement can be executed in duplicate and each executed document shall be regarded as an original of the executed document.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, and intending to be legally bound thereby, each of the parties hereto has caused this Agreement to be executed as of the respective date set forth adjacent to its respective representative's signature.

THIRD MILLENNIUM TECHNOLOGY, INC.

Date: April 21, 2000 By: James L. Busby
James L. Busby, President

CENTRAL MFG. INC.

Date: 03-31-00 By: Leo Stoller
Leo Stoller, President