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Subject: U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 85817853 - MURAUDIO - 930059-8021 - Request for Reconsideration Denied - Return to TTAB

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**UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)
OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT'S TRADEMARK APPLICATION**

U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 85817853

MARK: MURAUDIO



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GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION:

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APPLICANT: Luminos Industries Ltd.

CORRESPONDENT'S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO:

930059-8021

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REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION DENIED

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 6/1/2016

The trademark examining attorney has carefully reviewed applicant's request for reconsideration and is denying the request for the reasons stated below. See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(3); TMEP §§715.03(a)(ii)(B), 715.04(a). The following requirement(s) and/or refusal(s) made final in the Office action dated November 4, 2015 are maintained and continue to be final: (1) likelihood of confusion refusal under Section 2(d); and (2) translation requirement. See TMEP §§715.03(a)(ii)(B), 715.04(a).

In the present case, applicant's request has not resolved all the outstanding issues, nor does it raise a new issue or provide any new or compelling evidence with regard to the outstanding issues in the final Office action. In addition, applicant's analysis and arguments are not persuasive nor do they shed new light on the issues. Accordingly, the request is denied.

Applicant argues that "...a number of "MUR"-containing marks co-exist on the Principal Register, and Applicant has previously invited the Examining Attorney to review the following registrations which all begin with the prefix "mur."" But no evidence has been made of record concerning other third-party registrations containing the prefix MUR.

The mere submission of a list of registrations does not make such registrations part of the record. *In re Promo Ink*, 78 USPQ2d 1301, 1304 (TTAB 2006); TBMP §1208.02; TMEP §710.03.

To make third party registrations part of the record, an applicant must submit copies of the registrations, or the complete electronic equivalent from the USPTO's automated systems, prior to appeal. *In re Jump Designs LLC*, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1372-73 (TTAB 2006); *In re Ruffin Gaming*, 66 USPQ2d, 1924, 1925 n.3 (TTAB 2002); TBMP §1208.02; TMEP §710.03.

Moreover, the registrations reference by the applicant appear to be for goods and services that are predominantly different from or unrelated to those identified in applicant's application.

The weakness or dilution of a particular mark is generally determined in the context of the number and nature of similar marks in use in the marketplace in connection with similar goods and/or services. See *Nat'l Cable Tel. Ass'n, Inc. v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc.*, 937 F.2d 1572, 1579-80, 19 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1991); *In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.*, 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973). Evidence of widespread third-party use of similar marks with similar goods and/or services "is relevant to show that a mark is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of protection" in that industry or field. *Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondée en 1772*, 396 F.3d 1369, 1373-74, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see *In re Coors Brewing Co.*, 343 F.3d 1340, 1345, 68 USPQ2d 1059, 1062-63 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

However, evidence comprising only a small number of third-party registrations for similar marks with dissimilar goods and services, as in the present case, is generally entitled to little weight in determining the strength of a mark. See *AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Products, Inc.*, 474 F.2d 1403, 1406, 177 USPQ 268, 269 (C.C.P.A. 1973); *Richardson-Vicks Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.*, 216 USPQ 989, 992 (TTAB 1982). These few registrations are "not evidence of what happens in the market place or that customers are familiar with them." *AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Prods., Inc.*, 474 F.2d at 1406, 177 USPQ at 269; see *Richardson-*

Vicks Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 216 USPQ at 992. Thus, the few similar third-party registrations referenced by applicant are insufficient to establish that the wording MUR is weak or diluted.

Further, third-party registrations for similar marks with different or unrelated goods and services are of limited probative value in determining the strength of a mark. *See Kay Chems., Inc. v. Kelite Chems. Corp.*, 464 F.2d 1040, 1042, 175 USPQ 99, 101 (C.C.P.A. 1972); *In re Thor Tech, Inc.*, 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1639 (TTAB 2009).

Applicant also contends “Registrants’ goods are therefore all very different from the audiospeakers offered by Applicant and are offered to very different consumes and travel is very different channels of trade.” However, the fact that the goods of the parties differ is not controlling in determining likelihood of confusion. The issue is not likelihood of confusion between particular goods, but likelihood of confusion as to the source or sponsorship of those goods. *In re Majestic Distilling Co.*, 315 F.3d 1311, 1316, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003); *In re Shell Oil Co.*, 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993); TMEP §1207.01.

The final refusal under Section 2(d) and the final translation requirement are thus maintained and continued.

If applicant has already filed a timely notice of appeal with the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, the Board will be notified to resume the appeal. *See* TMEP §715.04(a).

If no appeal has been filed and time remains in the six-month response period to the final Office action, applicant has the remainder of the response period to (1) comply with and/or overcome any outstanding final requirement(s) and/or refusal(s), and/or (2) file a notice of appeal to the Board. TMEP §715.03(a)(ii)(B); *see* 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(3). The filing of a request for reconsideration does not stay or extend the time for filing an appeal. 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(3); *see* TMEP §§715.03, 715.03(a)(ii)(B), (c).

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