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SOURCE - N/A - EXAMINER BRIEF

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**UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE (USPTO)**

APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 77879157

MARK: ULTIMATE PUZZLE SOURCE



CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS:

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GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION:

<http://www.uspto.gov/main/trademarks.htm>

TTAB INFORMATION:

<http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/ttab/index.html>

APPLICANT: Source Interlink Magazines, LLC

CORRESPONDENT'S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO:

N/A

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EXAMINING ATTORNEY'S APPEAL BRIEF

Applicant has appealed the examining attorney's final refusal to register the mark ULTIMATE PUZZLE SOURCE (standard character drawing) for "magazine containing puzzles" in International Class 16. Registration was refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. 1052(d) because the mark so resembles the mark in U.S. Registration No. 3103446 for the mark THE ULTIMATE PUZZLE (and design) for "puzzles" in International Class 28, as to be likely to cause confusion or mistake, or to deceive within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

FACTS

On November 23, 2009, applicant applied to register the mark ULTIMATE PUZZLE SOURCE (standard character drawing) for "magazine containing puzzles".

On March 3, 2010, the examining attorney refused registration of the mark under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(d) and required a disclaimer statement regarding the term "PUZZLE SOURCE".

On September 3, 2010, applicant submitted a response to the first Office Action arguing against the refusal to register and failed to respond to the issue regarding the disclaimer requirement.

On September 14, 2010, the examining attorney issued a final Office Action maintaining the refusal under Section 2(d) of the Act as well as the requirement for a disclaimer statement regarding the term “PUZZLE SOURCE”.

On March 14, 2011, applicant concurrently filed a Request for Reconsideration and a Notice of Appeal with the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.

On March 17, 2011, the examining attorney accepted the amendment made to the application regarding the disclaimer of the term “PUZZLE SOURCE”, but denied the Request for Reconsideration to register the mark on the Principal Register based on the Section 2(d) refusal. The application was returned to the Board to resume the instant appeal. Applicant filed its appeal brief on May 17, 2011. The application was forwarded to the examining attorney for a brief in accordance with Trademark Rule 2.142(b) on May 17, 2011.

ISSUE

The sole issue for consideration in this appeal is whether applicant’s intended mark, ULTIMATE PUZZLE SOURCE (standard character drawing) when used in connection with applicant’s “magazine containing puzzles” in International Class 16 so resembles the mark in U.S. Registration No. 3103446 for the mark THE ULTIMATE PUZZLE (and design) for “puzzles” in International Class 28 as to be likely to cause confusion or mistake, or to deceive within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

ARGUMENT

CONFUSION IS LIKELY BETWEEN APPLICANT’S MARK “ULTIMATE PUZZLE SOURCE” (STANDARD CHARACTER DRAWING) AND REGISTRANT’S MARK “THE ULTIMATE PUZZLE SOURCE” (AND DESIGN)

The examining attorney refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(d), because applicant's mark, when used on or in connection with the identified goods, so resembles the mark in U.S. Registration No. 3103446 as to be likely to cause confusion, mistake, or to deceive.

The examining attorney must analyze each case in two steps to determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion. First, the examining attorney must look at the marks themselves for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. *In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.*, 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). Second, the examining attorney must compare the goods or services to determine if they

are related or if the activities surrounding their marketing are such that confusion as to origin is likely. *In re August Storck KG*, 218 USPQ 823 (TTAB 1983); *In re International Telephone and Telegraph Corp.*, 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978); *Guardian Products Co., v. Scott Paper Co.*, 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978).

Regarding the issue of likelihood of confusion, the question is not whether people will confuse the marks, but whether the marks will confuse people into believing that the goods they identify come from the same source. *In re West Point-Pepperell, Inc.*, 468 F.2d 200, 175 USPQ 558 (C.C.P.A. 1972). For that reason, the test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison. The question is whether the marks create the same overall impression. *Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton*, 214 F.2d 1322, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1890 (Fed. Cir. 2000); *Visual Information Inst., Inc. v. Vicon Indus. Inc.*, 209 USPQ 179 (TTAB 1980). The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. *Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co.*, 203 USPQ 537 (TTAB 1979); *Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co.*, 190 USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).

In this case, applicant seeks to register the mark ULTIMATE PUZZLE SOURCE (standard character drawing) while registrant owns the mark THE ULTIMATE PUZZLE (and design). Except for the addition of the descriptive term SOURCE, which applicant has disclaimed, and the design element on registrant's mark, both marks share the wording ULTIMATE PUZZLE. The examining attorney submits that the wording ULTIMATE PUZZLE is the dominant feature of both marks and creates a more significant commercial impression. Accordingly, average consumers viewing both marks will believe that the puzzles will come from the same source.

Generally, the examining attorney must look at the marks in their entireties under Section 2(d). Nevertheless, one feature of a mark may be recognized as more significant in creating a commercial impression. Greater weight is given to that dominant feature in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion. *In re National Data Corp.*, 224 USPQ 749 (Fed. Cir. 1985); *Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics, Inc.*, 534 F.2d 915, 189 USPQ 693 (CCPA 1976). *In re J.M. Originals Inc.*, 6 USPQ2d 1393 (TTAB 1988). Further, disclaimed matter is typically less significant or less dominant. Applicant has disclaimed the descriptive terms PUZZLE SOURCE.

Applicant asserts in its Appeal Brief at page 3 that the dominant portion of registrant's mark is composed of the term "PUZZLE" and the stylized design elements in the mark. However, applicant's assertion is flawed. When a mark consists of a word portion and a design portion, the word portion is more likely to be impressed upon a purchaser's memory and to be used in calling for the goods or services. *In re Appetito Provisions Co.*, 3 USPQ2d 1553 (TTAB 1987); *Amoco Oil Co. v. Amerco, Inc.*, 192 USPQ 729 (TTAB 1976).

Further, the design portion of registrant's mark consists of two oval shapes and a puzzle piece design forming the letter "e" in the term "Puzzle". The depiction of the

letter “e” as a puzzle piece only further supports and emphasizes the importance of the literal portion of the mark. The literal portion consists of the words “THE ULTIMATE PUZZLE” and the letter “e” in “Puzzle” is presented as a stylized puzzle piece. The design does not create a distinctive commercial impression separate and apart from the literal portion of the mark. Rather, it emphasizes the term “PUZZLE” in the literal portion and indicates the nature of the goods as being puzzles. Therefore, the literal portion of the registered mark must be given greater weight in determining whether or not a likelihood of confusion exists.

Meanwhile, applicant’s mark is comprised of the wording “ULTIMATE PUZZLE SOURCE”. An analysis of applicant’s mark reveals that the commercial impression created by the mark is grounded in the dominant portion: ULTIMATE. This term is distinctive when used in connection with goods of the type identified in the application, and is modified by the subordinate, descriptive term “PUZZLE SOURCE”. It is noted that applicant has disclaimed the term “PUZZLE SOURCE”. The disclaimed portion “PUZZLE SOURCE” plays a significantly lesser role in the overall commercial impression created by the mark.

Similarly, registrant’s mark, “THE ULTIMATE PUZZLE” (and design), is comprised of the dominant portion: “ULTIMATE”. The cited registration contains a disclaimer statement regarding the term “PUZZLE”. While the examining attorney cannot ignore a disclaimed portion of a mark and, as stated above, must view marks in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant in creating a commercial impression. *Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics, Inc.*, 534 F.2d 915, 189 USPQ 693 (CCPA 1976); *In re El Torito Restaurants Inc.*, 9 USPQ2d 2002 (TTAB 1988); *In re Equitable Bancorporation*, 229 USPQ 709 (TTAB 1986).

Here, the dominant portions of both marks are comprised of the term “ULTIMATE”. Thus, the dominant and most significant portions of the marks are identical in sound and meaning. Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding of likelihood of confusion. *RE/MAX of America, Inc. v. Realty Mart, Inc.*, 207 USPQ 960, 964 (TTAB 1980); *Molenaar, Inc. v. Happy Toys Inc.*, 188 USPQ 469 (TTAB 1975); *In re Cresco Mfg. Co.*, 138 USPQ 401 (TTAB 1963); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).

Further, whereas the term “ULTIMATE” is stylized in registrant’s mark, applicant has applied for its mark in standard characters. A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display. TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii); *see* 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a). Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters or otherwise in special form generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the marks could be presented in the same manner of display. *See, e.g., Squirrtco v. Tomy Corp.*, 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”); *In re Melville Corp.*, 18 USPQ2d 1386,

1387-88 (TTAB 1991); *In re Pollio Dairy Prods. Corp.*, 8 USPQ2d 2012, 2015 (TTAB 1988).

Accordingly, applicant's mark, were it to become registered, would contain the same dominant portion as registrant's mark, and could be presented in a stylization not only similar to but identical to that found in the registered mark. In this way, the dominant and most important features of both marks must be deemed to also be highly similar, if not identical, in appearance.

And if the goods and/or services of the respective parties are "similar in kind and/or closely related," as in the present matter, the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as would be required with diverse goods and/or services. *In re J.M. Originals Inc.*, 6 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (TTAB 1987); *see Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd.*, 393 F.3d 1238, 1242, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); TMEP §1207.01(b). Therefore, contrary to applicant's assertion on page 3 of its Brief, "the similarity of marks" in "sight, sound or meaning" will result "in a finding of likelihood of confusion" when the goods are closely related.

The trademark examining attorney further notes that the mere addition of a term to a registered mark does not obviate the similarity between the marks nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). *In re Chatam International Inc.*, 380 F.3d 1340, 71 USPQ2d 1944 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("GASPAR'S ALE and "JOSE GASPAR GOLD"); *Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.*, 526 F.2d 556, 188 USPQ 105 (C.C.P.A. 1975) ("BENGAL" and "BENGAL LANCER"); *Lilly Pulitzer, Inc. v. Lilli Ann Corp.*, 376 F.2d 324, 153 USPQ 406 (C.C.P.A. 1967) ("THE LILLY" and "LILLI ANN"); *In re El Torito Rests. Inc.*, 9 USPQ2d 2002 (TTAB 1988) ("MACHO" and "MACHO COMBOS"); *In re United States Shoe Corp.*, 229 USPQ 707 (TTAB 1985) ("CAREER IMAGE" and "CREST CAREER IMAGES"); *In re Corning Glass Works*, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985) ("CONFIRM" and "CONFIRMCELLS"); *In re Riddle*, 225 USPQ 630 (TTAB 1985) ("ACCUTUNE" and "RICHARD PETTY'S ACCU TUNE"); *In re Cosvetic Laboratories, Inc.*, 202 USPQ 842 (TTAB 1979) ("HEAD START" and "HEAD START COSVETIC"); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).

Applicant has effectively added the weak, descriptive term "SOURCE" to what is essentially a registered mark, while deleting the stylized components which play a smaller role in creating the overall commercial impression of the registered mark. Applicant has also deleted the article "THE" which is extremely weak and effectively devoid of source identifying significance. Applicant has taken a registered mark and deleted the weakest features of it while retaining the most distinctive and strongest aspect of the mark, and added the weak descriptive term "SOURCE". None of the modifications to the registered mark distinguish applicant's mark from that of registrant. Both marks are carried by the distinctive term "ULTIMATE".

Accordingly, the dominant and most significant portions of the parties' marks are extremely similar in appearance, and identical in sound and meaning.

THE GOODS ARE AT LEAST HIGHLY SIMILAR AND CONSUMERS WOULD BELIEVE THAT THEY ORIGINATE FROM THE SAME SOURCE

As noted, the second prong in analyzing likelihood of confusion is to compare the goods to determine if they are related. The goods of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. They need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing be such, that they could be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that could give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods come from a common source. *In re Martin's Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc.*, 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984); *In re Corning Glass Works*, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985); *In re Rexel Inc.*, 223 USPQ 830 (TTAB 1984); *Guardian Products Co., Inc. v. Scott Paper Co.*, 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978); *In re International Telephone & Telegraph Corp.*, 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978).

Applicant seeks registration of the proposed mark for “magazine containing puzzles”. Registrant’s mark is used in relation to “puzzles”.

The trademark examining attorney requests that the Board take judicial notice of the attached dictionary definition of the term “puzzle”. The term “puzzles” is the plural form of the word “puzzle.” See attached dictionary definition retrieved from the *American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*. The word “puzzle” is defined as meaning “[s]omething, such as a game, toy, or problem, that requires ingenuity and often persistence in solving or assembling” *Id.* All of the goods identified in both applicant’s and registrant’s identification of goods, by definition, fall within the meaning of the term “puzzle”. Each is specifically indicated as being a puzzle. The registrant offers puzzles, or something such as a game, toy, or problem that requires ingenuity and often persistence in solving or assembling, and registrant offers magazines containing the same things. Applicant offers books containing puzzles, or things such as problems that require ingenuity or persistence in solving. Consequently, the parties’ goods, if not deemed to be identical, must at least be considered highly similar.

On page 2 of its Appeal Brief, applicant argues that "a trademark owner cannot file and secure a registration in one class and then claim an exclusive right to use that mark in a class not cited in the registration". Indeed, the main thrust of applicant’s argument in support of registration hinges on this notion. The trademark examining attorney respectfully disagrees.

To the contrary, the fact that the Office classifies goods or services in different classes does not establish that the goods and services are unrelated under Trademark Act Section 2(d). See TMEP §1207.01(d)(v). The determination concerning the proper classification of goods or services is a purely administrative determination unrelated to the determination of likelihood of confusion. *Jean Patou, Inc. v. Theon, Inc.*, 9 F.3d 971,

975, 29 USPQ2d 1771, 1774 (Fed. Cir. 1993); *Nat'l Football League v. Jasper Alliance Corp.*, 16 USPQ2d 1212, 1216 n.5 (TTAB 1990).

Based on the logic put forth in applicant's Appeal Brief, it must be presumed that applicant would argue that a registration referencing goods such as clothing items which are classified in International Class 25 could not be the subject of a Section 2(d) refusal against an application for retail store services featuring clothing in International Class 35, given a similarity between the respective marks.

However, it is widely settled that consumers are likely to be confused by the use of similar marks on or in connection with goods such as clothing items and with services featuring or related to those goods, such as retail stores featuring clothing. *See In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc.*, 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (BIGG'S for retail grocery and general merchandise store services held confusingly similar to BIGGS for furniture); *In re U.S. Shoe Corp.*, 229 USPQ 707 (TTAB 1985) (CAREER IMAGE (stylized) for retail women's clothing store services and clothing held likely to be confused with CREST CAREER IMAGES (stylized) for uniforms); *In re United Service Distributors, Inc.*, 229 USPQ 237 (TTAB 1986) (design for distributorship services in the field of health and beauty aids held likely to be confused with design for skin cream); *In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp.*, 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (21 CLUB for various items of men's, boys', girls' and women's clothing held likely to be confused with THE "21" CLUB (stylized) for restaurant services and towels); *Steelcase Inc. v. Steelcare Inc.*, 219 USPQ 433 (TTAB 1983) (STEELCARE INC. for refinishing of furniture, office furniture, and machinery held likely to be confused with STEELCASE for office furniture and accessories); *Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Huskie Freightways, Inc.*, 177 USPQ 32 (TTAB 1972) (use of similar marks for trucking services and on motor trucks and busses is likely to cause confusion).

Further, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board have held that various electronic goods (which by definition must be classified in a goods International Class) are sufficiently related to computer or technology-related services (which by definition must be classified in a differing services International Class) such that a likelihood of confusion exists when the marks at issue are otherwise similar. *See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc.*, 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding "electronic transmission of data and documents via computer terminals" to be sufficiently related to facsimile machines, computers, and computer software such that confusion would be likely where the marks at issue convey a similar commercial impression); *MSI Data Corp. v. Microprocessor Sys., Inc.*, 220 USPQ 655 (TTAB 1983) (holding MSI for "computer hardware manufacturing services to the order of or specification of others" likely to be confused with MSI for "electronic ordering systems for gathering and transmitting source data comprising a recorder-transmitter and data receiver"); *Commc'ns Satellite Corp. v. Comcet, Inc.*, 429 F.2d 1245, 166 USPQ 353 (4th Cir. 1970) (holding COMSAT for satellite services likely to be confused with COMCET for computers because computers can be used to receive data transmitted by satellites).

It is noted that registrant has not limited its identification of goods to a particular type of puzzle distinguishable from applicant's goods. The presumption under Trademark Act Section 7(b), 15 U.S.C. §1057(b), is that registrant is the owner of the mark and that use of the mark extends to all goods and/or services identified in the registration. Further, registrant has not limited its identification of goods as to their location of sale. The presumption also implies that registrant operates in all normal channels of trade and reaches all classes of purchasers of the identified goods and/or services. *RE/MAX of America, Inc. v. Realty Mart, Inc.*, 207 USPQ 960, 964-5 (TTAB 1980). Thus, there is no limitation to registrant's trade channels and applicant's goods could reach the same purchasers in the same trade channels.

Applicant seeks to effectively collaterally attack the registered mark without following the formal procedure afforded under the Office's cancellation proceedings. This is inappropriate in an *ex parte* proceeding. TMEP §1207.01(d)(iv). Section 7(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1057(b), provides that a certificate of registration on the Principal Register shall be *prima facie* evidence of the validity of the registration, of registrant's ownership of the mark and of registrant's exclusive right to use the mark in commerce in connection with the goods or services specified in the certificate. During *ex parte* prosecution, an applicant will not be heard on matters that constitute a collateral attack on the cited registration. *See In re Dixie Restaurants*, 105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1997); *In re Calgon Corp.*, 435 F.2d 596, 168 USPQ 278 (C.C.P.A. 1971); *Cosmetically Yours, Inc. v. Clairol Inc.*, 424 F.2d 1385, 1387, 165 USPQ 515, 517 (C.C.P.A. 1970); *In re Peebles Inc.* 23 USPQ2d 1795, 1797 n. 5 (TTAB 1992); *In re White Swan Ltd.*, 8 USPQ2d 1534 (TTAB 1988); *In re Pollio Dairy Products Corp.*, 8 USPQ2d 2012, 2014-15 (TTAB 1988).

The examining attorney attached fifteen (15) third-party registrations from the USPTO's X-Search database to his Final office action dated September 14, 2010 demonstrating that the same entities offer goods of the types offered by both registrant and applicant. Contrary to applicant's argument, the same entities offer both printed puzzles in Class 16, and toy or game-like puzzles such as jigsaw puzzles or three-dimensional puzzles in Class 28. The examining attorney also attached a variety of screenshots from internet websites showing that both types of puzzles are marketed and offered through the same channels of trade. See Final office action dated September 14, 2010.

Applicant argues in its Appeal Brief at page 2 that the cited third-party registrations bear no relevance to whether or not a likelihood of confusion exists in the present matter. Contrary to applicant's assertion, this evidence shows that the goods listed therein, namely puzzles and printed publications featuring puzzles, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark. *See In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd.*, 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1203 (TTAB 2009); *In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.*, 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); *In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co.*, 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).

Further in its Appeal Brief at page 2, applicant argues that the cited third-party registrations actually undermine the trademark examining attorney's arguments, as each registration covers goods in both International Classes 16 and 28. Applicant argues that this demonstrates that the trademark owner must protect its mark in various International Classes to secure the exclusive right to use that mark in such classes. See applicant's Appeal Brief at page 2.

To the contrary, the opposite is the case. The cited third-party registrations demonstrate that the same entities offer goods of the types offered by both registrant and applicant, and that the goods of the respective parties are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark.

The examining attorney must determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion on the basis of the goods identified in the application and registration. If the cited registration describes the goods broadly and there are no limitations as to their nature, type, channels of trade or classes of purchasers, it is presumed that the registration encompasses all goods of the type described, that they move in all normal channels of trade, and that they are available to all potential customers. *In re Elbaum*, 211 USPQ 639 (TTAB 1981). Here registrant's goods are described simply as "puzzles". Applicant's goods are "magazines containing puzzles." Emphasis supplied. Clearly, the applicant's goods contain puzzles. An applicant may not restrict the scope of its goods and/or the scope of the goods covered in the registration by extrinsic argument or evidence, for example, as to the ingredients of the goods. *See, e.g., In re Bercut-Vandervoort & Co.*, 229 USPQ 763, 764 (TTAB 1986). It must be concluded that registrant's "puzzles" encompass all types of puzzles, including those in a printed publication format, such as a puzzle magazine.

As a consequence, consumers are likely to believe that the parties' goods originate from a common source.

Lastly, it is noted that applicant has referenced a variety of prior registrations either owned by applicant or third-parties throughout its Appeal Brief. Applicant's reliance on these registrations is improper, as they have not been made of record. In order to make such registrations of record, a copy of the registration, either from the paper USPTO record or a copy from the USPTO electronic records (e.g., USPTO X-Search) must be submitted. *See In re Volvo Cars of N. Am., Inc.*, 46 USPQ2d 1455, 1456 n.2 (TTAB 1998); TBMP §1208.02. Applicant has failed to attach any such records. Accordingly, the trademark examining attorney requests that the Board disregard this evidence in making its determination.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the examining attorney submits that the refusal to register applicant's mark ULTIMATE PUZZLE SOURCE (standard character drawing) as used in connection with "magazine containing puzzles" on the basis that it is confusingly similar to registrant's mark THE ULTIMATE PUZZLE for "puzzles" should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

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Definition of puzzle

Reference

- Dictionary
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- Anatomy
- Conversion Calculator

Word of the Day

adversity
Definition: (noun) a state or condition that is contrary to one of well-being.
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[Puvis de Chavannes, Pierre](#)

puz·zle (püz'əl) [KEY](#)

VERB:
puz·zled, puz·zling, puz·zles

VERB:
tr.

- To baffle or confuse mentally by presenting or being a difficult problem or matter.
- To clarify or solve (something confusing) by reasoning or study. *He puzzled out the significance of the statement.*

VERB:
intr.

- To be perplexed.
- To ponder over a problem in an effort to solve or understand it.

NOUN:

- Something, such as a game, toy, or problem, that requires ingenuity



1. something, such as a game, toy, or problem, that requires ingenuity and often persistence in solving or assembling
2. Something that baffles or confuses.
3. The condition of being perplexed; bewilderment.



ETYMOLOGY:

Origin unknown

OTHER FORMS:

puz'zler (*Noun*)

SYNONYMS:

puzzle, perplex, mystify, bewilder, confound

These verbs mean to cause bafflement or confusion. *Puzzle* suggests difficulty in solving or interpreting something: "*The poor creature puzzled me once . . . by a question merely natural and innocent*" (*Daniel Defoe*). *Perplex* stresses uncertainty or anxiety, as over reaching an understanding or finding a solution: *a dilemma that perplexed the committee*. *Mystify* implies defying comprehension by obscuring facts: *symbolism that mystifies me*. *Bewilder* emphasizes extreme mental confusion: "*The old know what they want; the young are sad and bewildered*" (*Logan Pearsall Smith*). To *confound* is to confuse and astonish: *God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise* (*1 Corinthians 1:27*).

[Thesaurus: synonyms for puzzle](#)

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