

From: Dombrow, Colleen

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Subject: U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 77443760 - ELECTRA-STEER - 116843.00008 - Request for
Reconsideration Denied - Return to TTAB

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**UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)
OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT'S TRADEMARK APPLICATION**

U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 77443760

MARK: ELECTRA-STEER



CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS:

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GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION:

<http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/index.jsp>

APPLICANT: Maval Manufacturing, Inc.

CORRESPONDENT'S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO:

116843.00008

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REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION DENIED

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 4/14/2014

The trademark examining attorney has carefully reviewed applicant's request for reconsideration and is denying the request for the reasons stated below. See 37 C.F.R. §2.64(b); TMEP §§715.03(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(E), 715.04(a). The refusal made final in the Office action dated September 18, 2013 is maintained and continues to be final. See TMEP §§715.03(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(E), 715.04(a). Please note, however, that the amendment to the identification of goods has been accepted. Accordingly, the requirement for an acceptable identification of goods is obviated.

In the present case, applicant's request has not resolved all the outstanding issue(s), nor does it raise a new issue or provide any new or compelling evidence with regard to the outstanding issue(s) in the final Office action. In addition, applicant's analysis and arguments are not persuasive nor do they shed new light on the issues. Accordingly, the request is denied.

The applicant argues, "Although one of the words within Applicant's mark, i.e., ELECTRA, may also be found in Registration No. 1,247,564, the entire mark is not similar in sight, or sound, and connotes a different meaning and commercial impression. Moreover, marks are usually perceived in their entireties, so all components must be given appropriate weight." This argument, however, is not persuasive. Specifically, the applicant's mark, ELECTRA-STEER is similar to the registrant's mark ELECTRA because they both include the identical wording ELECTRA. Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where there are similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appearing in both applicant's and registrant's mark. See *Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce*, 228 USPQ 689 (TTAB 1986), *aff'd sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Ass'n*, 811 F.2d 1490, 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH); *In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp.*, 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (21 CLUB and "21" CLUB (stylized)); *In re Corning Glass Works*, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985) (CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS); *In re Collegian Sportswear Inc.*, 224 USPQ 174 (TTAB 1984) (COLLEGIAN OF CALIFORNIA and COLLEGIENNE); *In re Pellerin Milnor Corp.*, 221 USPQ 558 (TTAB 1983) (MILTRON and MILLTRONICS); *In re BASF A.G.*, 189 USPQ 424 (TTAB 1975) (LUTEXAL and LUTEX); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

Further, the applicant has merely added the descriptive word STEER to the registrant's mark. The mere addition of a term to a registered mark generally does not obviate the similarity between the marks nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d). See *In re Chatam Int'l Inc.*, 380 F.3d 1340, 71 USPQ2d 1944 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (GASPAR'S ALE and JOSE GASPAR GOLD); *Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.*, 526 F.2d 556, 188 USPQ 105 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (BENGAL and BENGAL LANCER); *Lilly Pulitzer, Inc. v. Lilli Ann Corp.*, 376 F.2d 324, 153 USPQ 406 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (THE LILLY and LILLI ANN); *In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp.*, 91 USPQ2d 1266 (TTAB 2009) (TITAN and VANTAGE TITAN); *In re El Torito Rests., Inc.*, 9 USPQ2d 2002 (TTAB 1988) (MACHO and MACHO COMBOS); *In re Corning Glass Works*, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985) (CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS); *In re U.S. Shoe Corp.*,

229 USPQ 707 (TTAB 1985) (CAREER IMAGE and CREST CAREER IMAGES); *In re Riddle*, 225 USPQ 630 (TTAB 1985) (ACCUTUNE and RICHARD PETTY'S ACCU TUNE); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).

Additionally, consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark. See *Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondée En 1772*, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005); *Presto Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc.*, 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (“it is often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered” when making purchasing decisions).

Accordingly, the applicant's mark is similar to the registrant's mark.

The applicant further argues, “Therefore, all automobile parts are **not *per se*** related and each product must be considered in light of the individual product characteristics and relevant channels of trade.” This argument, however, is not persuasive. Specifically, the evidence attached to the previous Office actions and incorporated by reference herein shows that goods similar to those of the applicant and those of the registrant travel through the same channels of trade to the same classes of purchasers. Further, the registrant's “electric motors” are written broadly enough to encompass the applicant's “assist motors.” Accordingly, because the applicant's mark is similar to the registrant's mark and the goods are overlapping and closely related, confusion as to source is likely and registration is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

Applicant argues, “Additionally, Applicant's goods are used with street rods, muscle cars, atv's and utv's which are different than Registrants' goods and involve different channels of trade.” This argument, however, is not persuasive. Specifically, the registrant's identification is not limited in any way and therefore can be for use with street rods, muscle cars, atv's and utv's. With respect to applicant's and registrant's goods and/or services, the question of likelihood of confusion is determined based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See, e.g., *Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC*, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-70, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012); *Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc.*, 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

Absent restrictions in an application and/or registration, the identified goods and/or services are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” *In re Viterra Inc.*, 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting *Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc.*, 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Additionally, unrestricted and

broad identifications are presumed to encompass all goods and/or services of the type described. *See In re Jump Designs, LLC*, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006) (citing *In re Elbaum*, 211 USPQ 639, 640 (TTAB 1981)); *In re Linkvest S.A.*, 24 USPQ2d 1716, 1716 (TTAB 1992).

Finally, applicant argues, “Applicant sells its products at a high price, namely, approximately \$1,000.” Applicant further argues, “The average consumer will unlikely be confused as to the source of the products because of the high cost and disparate trade channels. Because of the higher prices the consumers of these automobile products have a higher degree of sophistication and at least a higher awareness as to the goods they are buying.” This argument, however, is not persuasive. The fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion. TMEP §1207.01(d)(vii); *see, e.g., Imagineering Inc. v. Van Klassens Inc.*, 53 F.3d 1260, 1265, [34 USPQ2d 1526, 1530](#) (Fed. Cir. 1995); *Top Tobacco LP v. N. Atl. Operating Co.*, 101 USPQ2d 1163, 1170 (TTAB 2011).

Accordingly, because the applicant’s mark is similar to the registrant’s mark and the goods are overlapping and related, confusion as to source is likely and registration is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

The filing of a request for reconsideration does not extend the time for filing a proper response to a final Office action or an appeal with the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Board), which runs from the date the final Office action was issued/mailed. *See* 37 C.F.R. §2.64(b); TMEP §715.03, (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(E), (c).

If time remains in the six-month response period to the final Office action, applicant has the remainder of the response period to comply with and/or overcome any outstanding final requirement(s) and/or refusal(s) and/or to file an appeal with the Board. TMEP §715.03(a)(2)(B), (c). However, if applicant has already filed a timely notice of appeal with the Board, the Board will be notified to resume the appeal. *See* TMEP §715.04(a).

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